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This paper examines the progress of state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in the People’s 
Republic of China. After defining SOEs and considering their scope of operation within the PRC 
economy, the focus of the paper is on the major reform waves that followed the deterioration of 
SOE profitability in the early 1990s. The oil industry serves to illustrate industry-specific SOE 
reform trends as well as the latest reform developments. Until today, a stable, successful, long-
term arrangement of state ownership has remained elusive. SOE reform is incomplete as long 
as a number of fundamental governance issues are not resolved. But these are difficult to 
resolve in the context of Party-controlled state-owned enterprises.   
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Summary 
 
State ownership dominated the pre-reform economy of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). 
The transition to a more market-oriented economy from 1978 onward triggered a deterioration in 
the finances of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which eventually led to major SOE reforms in 
1998-2000. Employment and losses were drastically reduced, and thousands of SOEs were 
merged or allowed to go bankrupt. In 2003, the remaining SOEs were organized under the newly 
established central State(-owned) Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) or 
its provincial equivalents. Reform then continued within these institutions. SOEs transformed 
progressively into formal companies, underwent various forms of restructuring, and began to 
surrender some of their profit.  
By the late 2000s, SOEs came to be seen as instrumental in spearheading state industrial policies, 
an emphasis that subsequently weakened, with SOEs being crucial to only a few industrial policy 
areas today. By tightening (Chinese Communist) Party control over SOEs as well as private 
enterprises, the distinction in industrial policy became one of domestic vs. foreign enterprises 
rather than SOEs versus private enterprises. Since 2013, new SOE reform initiatives emerged; 
key among them was the promotion of mixed ownership, a new state capital management system, 
and various elements of a “modern enterprise system.” Bbut progress has been slow. By 2018, 
SOE reform discussions centered on strengthening Party control over SOEs and making SOEs 
“stronger, better, and bigger.” 
State ownership today accounts for little more than one-third of gross domestic product (GDP) 
and it is concentrated in typical public goods sectors such as public facilities, education, health, 
and public management. In manufacturing, SOEs account for only one-quarter of assets. The 
state has a monopoly position in petroleum and natural gas extraction, the tobacco industry, and 
electricity production/distribution and water supply. The state controls all banks and owns the 
three major airlines and all three telecommunication providers. 
Questions persist about the objectives of SOEs, ownership rights over SOEs, and SOE 
supervision. SOE objectives are ambiguous. SASAC’s ownership of the center’s state-owned 
conglomerates is exceedingly weak in that SASAC does not appoint key personnel of its 
companies, has only limited claims to SOE profits, has little regulatory authority, and seems 
preoccupied primarily with resolving problems in individual SOEs and supporting top-level 
industry priorities. To some extent, SASAC appears to be a smokescreen for the actual channels 
of authority and a convenient location in which to deposit (and make invisible) SOE problems. 
Supervision within SOEs is fraught when basic control mechanisms established by the Company 
Law are sidestepped through Party precedence. Adoption of the formal company system and 
mixed ownership reform have allowed (re-)capitalization of listed SOEs by means other than the 
state budget and state bank lending and thereby freed the state of some of the liability for SOE 
failure, but it has not necessarily led to good governance. 
Corporate governance in the PRC is ultimately a question of how the Party is to manage the state-
owned Party-controlled enterprises in an environment where Western principles of good corporate 
governance are not an option. While past achievements may be impressive, current SOE 
performance suggests a dilemma in that an increasingly sophisticated economy exceeds the 
steering capacity of an authoritarian Leninist regime, while the correspondingly mature institutions 
needed to support a modern economy and to advance economic growth are missing.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) have played a major and, over time, changing role in the 
economic development of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). This paper examines the 
evolving role of SOEs in the PRC and evaluates SOE reform measures in light of SOE 
performance. It elaborates on potential future reforms with an eye to how to reform SOEs to 
maintain their economic viability and competitiveness and to enhance their contribution to long-
term economic growth. 
2. In the pre-reform (pre-1978) PRC economy, state ownership dominated. After the founding of 
the PRC in 1949, private enterprises and Kuomintang (Nationalist) enterprises were nationalized, 
and a new economy-wide industrial base in state ownership was established. Between 1957 and 
1977, SOEs and the planned economy defined the government and its operations. The 
government ran the economy via physical output (and investment) plans. SOEs directly 
accounted for approximately half of government budget revenues and expenditures. In the reform 
period (since 1978), the commanding position of SOEs was challenged with the introduction of a 
dual track price system (plan and market prices for one and the same good) and eventually the 
elimination of most plan prices in the early 1990s, the emergence of competitive rural collective-
owned enterprises, an end to output planning, and changes to SOE financing mechanisms,  
3. By the early 1990s, financial measures showed SOE performance to be deteriorating rapidly. 
In the case of industry—i.e., mining, manufacturing, and utilities—SOE profits throughout the pre-
reform period (1949-1977) were equivalent to approximately 10% to 15% of gross domestic 
product (GDP), and together with taxes to approximately 20% of GDP (Figure 1). In the reform 
period, these percentages declined drastically. Profits then recovered to a level equivalent to just 
4% of GDP in 2007, before falling again and ending the period in 2016 at 2%. The history of SOE 
performance in the PRC is thus a varied one and linked intricately to economic transition and 
reform measures across the economy.  
4. A large body of literature examines various aspects of SOEs in the PRC. For example, Hong 
and Nong (2013) argue that SOEs are in dire need of reform. According to their calculations at 
the time, the profits of only two SOEs (China National Petroleum Corporation and China Mobile) 
account for one-third of all SOE profits. If SOEs had to pay market rent on land, 67% of their 
nominal profit would be eliminated. If SOEs had to pay a market interest rate of 4.68% on their 
borrowing instead of the interest rate of 1.6% they actually paid, another 47% of their nominal 
profit would disappear. The authors wanted to break the SOEs’ monopoly over bureaucratic 
interests and strictly regulate the conduct of SOEs. Lam et al. (2017), in a working paper on 
PRC “zombie” firms—firms with, among others, three subsequent years of losses—point out 
that SOEs account for half of total debt and about one-third of employment in zombie firms.1 
5. In contrast, authors such as Cui (2011) and Huang (2011) see an important role for the state 
in economic development. SOEs can be a reservoir of value and a source of recurrent income 
for the state, more so than if economic activity were left to the private sector. Land plays a 
special role: Harking back to Sun Yat-Sen (the founding father of the Republic of China, in 
1912), the increase in land value that is not a result of the private owner’s effort should go to the 
public, i.e., an argument is made for the state to retain control over land. Finally, in this view, the 
state is particularly well suited to reorganize SOEs rather than to let their value dissipate via 
low-priced sell-offs. 
                                                 
1 The authors report that about 2,000 central SOEs (with total assets of about 4% of GDP) and more than 7,000 
local SOEs have officially been declared zombie firms. For perspective, total SOE assets in 2016 were equivalent to 
56% of GDP (Statistical Yearbook 2017, p. 56; Industry Statistical Yearbook 2017, p. 3).  
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6. Another body of literature has noted that SOE efficiency growth (typically in a neoclassical 
analytical framework) tends to lag behind efficiency growth in other ownership forms (for example, 
Brandt and Zhu, 2010). But it can also be argued that the performance of SOEs, particularly their 
financial performance as measured by profitability, does not necessarily reflect some intrinsic 
shortcoming of SOEs but the economic and political constraints these enterprises face (Holz, 
2003).  
7. In an earlier study, Xu and Wang (1999) find that a listed firm’s profitability is positively 
correlated with the fraction of legal person shares (shares by state-owned entities), but 
uncorrelated or negatively correlated with the fraction of (outright) state shares; i.e., ministries 
holding stakes in listed SOEs may not be beneficial to the listed SOEs’ profitability, but SOEs and 
other state units holding stakes in the listed SOEs is. In a study not specific to the PRC, Dewenter 
and Malatests (2001) find that SOEs have inferior profitability (perhaps for good social and 
political reasons), but that privatization does not improve profitability after privatization; profitability 
improves over the three years before privatization. In other words, the government’s preparation 
for privatization improves profitability, or, in yet other words, SOEs could be more profitable if the 
government chooses to make profitability a priority, and privatization may at best serve to 
perpetuate profitability gains. The authors also find that SOEs tend to use more labor than their 
private counterparts and are more leveraged.  
Figure 1: Industrial State-owned Enterprise Profit (and Tax) Measures 
  
GDP = gross domestic product; SOE = state-owned enterprise. 
Notes: 
1. Industry denotes mining, manufacturing, and utilities. 
2. Profit denotes profit of profitable enterprise, less losses of loss-making enterprises. 
3. SOEs denotes SOEs in the early years and “state-owned and state-controlled enterprises” once this 
term was adopted in the statistics (likely in 1998, although no date is mentioned in the source). 
4. The source states that ‘profit and tax’ values of 1958-1960 are likely exaggerated. 
Sources: Industry Statistical Yearbook 1993, p. 66; 2012, p. 23; 2013, p. 13, 2014, p. 13; 2015, p. 13; 
2016, p. 13; 2017, pp. 7 and 13. GDP values are from the NBS online database. 
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8. Lardy (2014) stresses the role of private ownership and markets over state ownership and 
state-led industrial policy for the PRC’s economic growth. In contrast, the Trump administration 
as of 2018 seems to believe that the PRC’s industrial policy and state ownership are particularly 
beneficial to the country’s (economic and political) rise. 
9. This paper takes a broader view of the evolving role of SOEs in the PRC and evaluates current 
SOE reform measures and performance. The following section presents summary data on the 
extent and performance of SOEs in the PRC. The subsequent sections discuss the waves of SOE 
reforms since the 1980s and their effects, present a case study of the oil industry, and evaluate 
current challenges for state ownership. The final section concludes and examines reform options 
going forward. 
 
II. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE DEFINITION, EXTENT, AND PERFORMANCE 
10.  A first distinction is between state-owned “units” (SOUs) and state-owned “enterprises” 
(SOEs). SOUs comprise all SOEs plus state-owned facilities (shiye danwei), such as universities, 
and state-owned administrative organs (xingzheng danwei), such as government departments 
and their immediate extensions.  
11. The focus frequently is on SOEs only. The definition of state-owned enterprises in the PRC 
depends on the institution involved:2  
 The National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) classifies state enterprises according to their 
registration modus. 
 The Finance Ministry in its statistics covers state enterprises of which it is the ultimate 
owner. 
 The central State(-owned) Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) 
provides summary statistics on the state enterprises under its supervision and 
administration and those under provincial supervision and administration, i.e., on the bulk 
of non-financial state enterprises, that are, theoretically, a subset of the previous category. 
12. The NBS and the Finance Ministry statistics differ if some state enterprises are not formally 
registered, or are not regarded by the Finance Ministry as under its remit. The Finance Ministry 
statistics cover SOEs in all sectors of the economy, while the NBS provides detailed data only for 
SOEs in industry (and to a limited extent in a few other sectors). 
13. The NBS statistics on SOEs, especially those on SOEs in industry (Figure 1), tend to be the 
most widely used in the literature. The NBS definition of industrial SOEs has changed over time. 
A first innovation occurred after the Company Law was introduced in 1993. Through 1998, 
industrial SOEs then comprised:  
 all traditional SOEs (all unreformed SOEs),  
 joint enterprises between two or more SOEs and joint enterprises between an SOE and a 
collective-owned enterprise (together accounting for a tiny fraction of industrial output), 
and  
 solely state-owned limited liability companies.  
Since 1998, the NBS uses the term industrial “state-owned and state-controlled enterprises” 
                                                 
2 OECD (2015, p. 14) defines SOEs as “any corporate entity recognised by national law as an enterprise, and in 
which the state exercises ownership.” 
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(SOSCEs) to denote the aggregate of 
 pre-1998 definition SOEs (comprising the three categories above), and  
 all (other) shareholding companies (i.e., limited liability companies and stock companies) 
in which the state has a controlling share.3  
Since 1998, the term “state-owned enterprises” (SOEs) in the NBS statistics tends to refer only 
to traditional (i.e., unreformed) SOEs and thereby, in contrast to the practice before 1998, 
excludes joint enterprises involving an SOE as well as solely state-owned limited liability 
companies.4  
14. In the following, the term “SOEs” will be used as the overarching term that captures both the 
pre-1998 definition SOEs and the SOSCE category as defined since 1998. When necessary for 
clarity in a particular context, the precise terminology is used, such as “traditional (or: unreformed) 
SOEs,” and “SOSCEs.” When presenting statistics that labeled “SOSCEs” in the source, that term 
is retained rather than switching to the (by agreement) equivalent generic term “SOEs.” 
A. State-owned Enterprise Data across Sources 
15. Table 1 presents 2015 sector data on SOSCE (or: SOE) enterprise numbers as well as on 
their assets, equity, and employment. These data are taken from three sources: the Finance 
Ministry (abbreviated in the table “FM”), excluding the finance sector, SASAC, and NBS (for 
above-norm industrial SOSCEs).5  
16. Focusing on industry (mining, manufacturing, and utilities), for which all three sources provide 
data, the employment values match reasonably well (around 17mio). The three sources diverge 
significantly in the case of enterprise numbers (the Finance Ministry with 42,816 industrial SOEs 
reports about 20% more enterprises than SASAC, and about twice as many as the NBS). SASAC 
reports almost twice as much assets and equity as the Finance Ministry and the NBS do.6 
                                                 
3 State-controlled companies come in two forms. Absolute state control (guoyou juedui konggu) implies that the 
state holds more than 50% of total capital (ziben). Relative state control (guoyou xiangdui konggu) implies that although 
the state holds less than 50% of total capital, (i) the state share is relatively large compared to the shares of other 
ownership categories, i.e., "relative state control" in its narrow meaning (xiangdui konggu), or (ii) even though one or 
more other ownership categories have a larger capital share than the state, the state in effect holds the control rights 
by agreement (xieyi kongzhi). Both forms of state-controlled companies are included in the definition. 
4 The NBS has implemented similar classifications and transitions in the definition of “SOEs” for other economic 
sectors. The 2013 economic census yielded registration-based data on all legal person units in the PRC; the statistics 
do not provide the aggregate SOSCE measure. The registration-based classification includes a stock company 
category, which, however, does not come with a state vs. non-state breakdown.  
5 2015 is the most recent year for which SASAC data are available. The finance sector data reported by SASAC 
likely reflect minor financial operations of otherwise non-financial SOEs. In the NBS coverage, above-norm industrial 
enterprises are enterprises with annual main business revenue in excess of CNY 20mio.  
6 It could be that SASAC does not net out the non-state share of SOE assets and equity while the Finance Ministry 
and the NBS may do (perhaps in proportion to equity shares). SASAC’s reported national total assets and equity also 
exceed the Finance Ministry figure, by about one-third; but SASAC also reports a second figure for national total assets 
and equity (with identical label “total”), which is smaller than its first figure and closer to (and below) the Finance Ministry 
values, and might reflect SASAC’s estimate of the state share only. 
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Table 1: SOSCE Data in Different Sources (2015) 
 Enterprises Assets (bn yuan) Equity (bn yuan) Employment (thousand) FM SASAC NBS FM SASAC NBS FM SASAC NBS FM SASAC NBS 
National total 167,399 124,966 140,683 183,839 48,241 70,422  36,506 30,946
Alternative total (unexplained total) 119,912 39,860
  
1. Agriculture 6,954 2,838 1,079 893 384 383  2,614 450
  1.1 Farming 3,033 1,039 643 388 217 190  1,725 220
  1.2 Forestry 1,546 453 187 130 72 42  658 116
  1.3 Husbandry 712 0 57 0 23 0  82 0
  1.4 Fishery 321 0 23 0 8 0  33 0
  1.5 Implicit residual 1,342 1,346 169 375 63 151  116 114
2. Industry* 42,816 36,771 19,273 38,210 62,101 39,740 15,671 26,485 15,126 17,653 16,721 17,778
  2.1 Coal 2,422 2,341 937 3,741 6,520 3,980 1,105 1,965 1,178 3,040 2,858 3,210
  2.2 Petroleum, petrochemicals 771 812 304 4,537 11,343 3,214 3,478 6,474 1,550 1,940 1,797 1,169
  2.3 Metallurgical industry 2,596 2,606 4,721 7,808 1,255 2,699  2,004 1,853
  2.4 Building materials 2,959 2,841 995 1,624 343 609  609 563
  2.5 Chemical industry 3,081 2,749 1,171 2,071 3,243 2,018 612 1,138 641 1,119 1,047 873
  2.6 Forest industry 153 96 17 20 2 6  20 12
  2.7 Foods 2,015 1,210 1,000 347 366 356 112 144 129 302 269 323
  2.8 Tobacco 146 438 106 897 155 908 695 61 679 206 161 201
  2.9 Textiles 485 724 403 123 549 146 43 307 64 185 273 275
  2.10 Pharmaceuticals 864 7,024 422 363 7,120 389 213 3,119 220 301 2,902 306
  2.11 Machinery industry 7,646 1,336 2,217 4,687 3,049 4,596 1,938 1,549 1,815 2,687 1,091 2,356
    of which: automobiles 1,317 1,289 741 1,838 2,457 2,738 911 995 1,149 914 834 1,249
  2.12 Electronics 1,844 1,688 613 1,066 1,449 1,177 489 713 509 641 662 703
  2.13 Power industry 7,126 6,576 4,397 9,748 15,612 11,141 3,332 6,444 4,195 2,124 2,133 2,483
  2.14 Municipal public goods, utilities 5,525 3,860 2,219 2,444 900 1,114 863 639
  2.15 Other industry 5,183 2,517 2,678 1,393 1,155 697 1,613 718
  2.16 Implicit residual, NBS: All else 0 -47 7703 0 -592 11,815 0 -554 4,145 -1 -257 5,880
3. Construction 10,343 8,988 10,055 13,781 2,920 4,302 2,700 3,872
4. Geological prosp.,water conservancy 1,714 892 774 663 457 361 155 119
5. Transport and storage 17,152 8,089 18,904 14,274 6,825 6,624 4,903 2,610
  5.1 Railway transport 1,317 212 6,463 538 2,331 324 1,962 66
  5.2 Road transport 4,300 3,780 6,836 8,675 2,450 3,707 1,855 1,661
  5.3 Water transport 1,580 1,439 1,143 1,965 549 962 202 195
  5.4 Air transport 632 590 1,202 1,438 554 673 329 383
  5.6 Implicit residual 2,099 2,068 1,062 1,658 634 957  238 305
  5.5 Storage (SASAC: new item) 7,224 3,251 2,199 2,178 307 351 317 179
6. Post and telecommunications 1,428 687 3,599 6,069 2,193 4,325 1,662 1,193
7. Trade and catering 25,317 19,096 6,574 10,235 1,976 3,242 2,147 2,012
8. Real estate 16,152 15,280 13,899 19,230 3,865 5,553 788 856
9. Information technology services 2,008 1,673 379 366 164 180 213 194
10. Social services 26,232 17,961 23,638 29,402 11,168 14,703 1,990 1,453
11. Health, sports, welfare 800 556 175 165 72 50 116 115
12. Education, culture, broadcast. 6,139 1,906 767 263 466 143  442 134
13.Scientific research, techn. services 8,111 5,272 1,395 1,591 559 681  736 718
14. Admin. organs, mass org., others 2,233 21,234 1,521  389 
SASAC: Finance  1,627 22,535 2,989   427
SASAC: Others  79 92 51   3
Enterprise size    
  (1) Large  8,377 89,706 33,343   19,604
  (2) Medium-sized  25,085 34,216 11,562   7,468
  (3) Small  41,759 30,001 12,037   3,226
  (4) Micro  49,745 29,916 13,480   759
Organizational form    
  (1) Company system  116,142 174,483 66,504   28,318
   of which: solely state-invested  33,417 61,670 28,051   7,271
  (2) Not company system  8,824 9,357 3,917   2,739
Profit     
  (1) Profitable  78,900 145,006 58,823   21,827
  (2) Loss-making  46,066 38,833 11,598   9,230
Supervision / administration     
  (1) SASAC   42,411 47,581 15,850   14,186
  (2) Local ASACs  82,555 72,331 24,010   16,760
Regions (do not add up)    
  (1) Eastern sea-borders  65,237 105,442 41,969   14,216
  (2) Middle central  23,854 28,967 10,439   8,215
  (3) Western remote  28,865 36,941 13,016   8,096
Economic functions    
  (1) Basic industries  37,522 77,944 33,791   16,418
  (2) General production & processing  22,326 21,101 8,579   8,563
  (3) Business services and others   65,118 84,794 28,052   6,076
SOSCE = state-owned and state-controlled enterprise (category); FM = Finance Ministry; SASAC = State(-owned) Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission; NBS = National Bureau of Statistics; Employment: = year-end employment (in the case of FM data: staff and workers). 
* NBS industry data come in approximately 40 sector categories, which are aggregated as much as possible here to match the FM and SASAC 
classification. Specifically, the NBS industry categories matched into the FM/SASAC classification here are 2.1 Mining and Washing of Coal: 2.2 
Extraction of Petroleum and Natural Gas; Processing of Petroleum, Coking and Processing of Nuclear Fuel; 2.5 Manufacture of Raw Chemical 
Materials and Chemical Products; 2.7 Manufacture of Food; Processing of Food from Agricultural Products; 2.8 Manufacture of Tobacco; 2.9 
Manufacture of Textile; Manufacture of Textile, Wearing Apparel and Accessories; Manufacture of Leather, Fur, Feather and Related Products and 
Footwear; 2.10 Manufacture of Medicines; 2.11, Manufacture of General Purpose Machinery; Manufacture of Special Purpose Machinery; Manufacture 
of Automobiles; 2.11 sub-category Manufacture of Automobiles; 2.12 Manufacture of Computers, Communication and Other Electronic Equipment; 
2.13 Production and Supply of Electric Power and Heat Power; 2.16 All Others. 
Sources: Fiscal Yearbook 2016, SASAC Yearbook 2016, NBS database (above-norm industrial enterprises).
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17. Overall, the employment data may yet be the most meaningful. For perspective, in 2015 
SOEs (not including employment in non-enterprise state units) accounted for approximately 5% 
of economy-wide employment.7 
18. Approximately half of SOE employment is in industry. Of employment in industrial SOEs, 
approximately half is in the coal industry, pharmaceutical industry or machinery industry (SASAC 
or Finance Ministry data), and power industry, with another quarter in the petroleum, metallurgical, 
and chemical industry.8 Construction, transport and storage, post and telecommunications, trade 
and catering, and social services account for approximately one-third of total SOE employment. 
Employment in the sector “government, (Chinese Communist) Party, mass organizations and 
others” is only 1% of the total (while this sector accounts for 16% of SOE assets); the rationale 
likely being that the data only cover “enterprises” and thus exclude “non-enterprise units.” 
19. The SASAC data come with further distinctions. Two-thirds of employment is in large 
enterprises (which account for only 7% of all SASAC SOEs but approximately half of assets and 
equity). More than 90% of SOEs (by any measure) are organized as companies, of which less 
than half are solely state-owned. One-third of SOEs are loss-making. About one-third of SOEs 
are organized under SASAC (rather than local ASACs), although with regard to employment the 
central and local shares are about equal. More than half of SOEs are located in the coastal 
Eastern region rather than in the central or Western regions. Approximately half of SOE 
employment is in basic industries, with the remainder split between “general production and 
processing” and “business services and others.” The data imply that each of the approximately 
100 SASAC conglomerates in 2015 comprised 1,250 enterprises on average. 
B. The Extent of State Ownership across the Economy 
20. Official data by ownership across the economy are not available for output measures or for 
employment, nor for balance sheet or profit and loss account measures. Value-added by 
ownership can be derived or estimated sector by sector across the 19 economic sectors from 
which the NBS derives the PRC’s gross domestic product (GDP) value (Table 2). The coverage 
is all state-owned productive units, not only in those officially labeled “enterprises.” The share of 
derived/estimated value-added in state-owned and state-controlled units (SOSCUs) varies greatly 
across sectors. While the SOSCU value-added share approaches unity in public management, 
finance, and utilities, its share in manufacturing is only 14% and in agriculture around 2%. Overall, 
SOSCUs account for approximately 39% of GDP.  
21.  Finance accounts for most of the value-added produced in state ownership at 19%. 
Manufacturing follows at 11% and then come the typical public goods sectors—public 
management (10%), education (8%) and utilities (5%)—and potentially competitive sectors such 
as construction (7%), trade (6%), and transport, storage and post (6%). 
22. Further, dispersed data on the scope of state ownership are available. As of early 2018, SOEs 
reportedly account for 40% of the PRC’s stock market valuation. Of the central government’s SOE 
portfolio, 63% is listed on the stock market. SOEs account for 45% of all debt in the PRC (and 
two-thirds of the non-financial corporate sector’s debt); total SOE debt stands at approximately 
115% of GDP. The state accounts for approximately 15% of employment (presumably this 
includes employment in state-owned units that are not “enterprises”). Of the central government’s 
                                                 
7  This percentage is obtained by comparing the Finance Ministry employment figure of 36.506mio to the 
nationwide employment figure (Statistical Yearbook) of 774.51mio. 
8 The NBS data come with a breakdown into approximately 40 industries that have for the purpose of comparison 
here been aggregated (as meaningful) into the 16-sector classification used in the Finance Ministry and SASAC 
sources, and otherwise enter the residual category. 
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SOEs, 67 companies ranked on the 2017 Fortune Global 500 list. Central enterprises’ income tax 
payments in 2016 accounted for approximately one-quarter of the center’s fiscal revenues (with 
no expenditure category indicating transfers to central enterprises).9 
 
 
C. State-owned Enterprise Profitability (Finance Ministry Data) 
23. The Fiscal Yearbook, issued by the Finance Ministry, provides a relatively comprehensive set 
of data for the years since 2006. The variables are balance sheet and profit and loss account 
measures, including sales revenue and main business revenue. Explicit output data such as 
value-added are not available.10 
24. State enterprises are either central or local non-financial enterprises, with one-third of all state 
enterprises in 2016 being considered central, up from one-sixth in 2006 (Table 3). Central 
enterprises in 2016 accounted for almost half of SOE assets (a slight decline from 2006) and 
                                                 
9 See Schumpeter (1 March 2018), Ferrarini and Hinojales (2018), IMF (2018), Leutert (2018a), and the NBS 
database. Miura (2015) cites a 2009 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study which 
found that SOEs effectively controlled the management of 70% of the (then) 1,342 listed companies. 
10 Profitability is used as a performance measure rather than some efficiency measure derived from production 
function estimations; value-added data or other output values are frequently not available. (Also see Appendix 2.) 
Table 2. SOSCE Share in Gross Domestic Product (2015) 
 GDP 
(CNY 
bn) 
Assu-
med 
SOSCE 
share 
Derived 
SOSCE 
value-
added 
(CNY 
bn) 
Sector 
share in 
SOSCE 
value-
added 
(%) 
Gross domestic product (GDP) 68,905  
Agriculture, forestry, animal husbandry and FISHERY 6,291 0.024 150 0.55 
Mining 1,910 0.417 797 2.94 
Manufacturing 20,242 0.144 2,921 10.78 
Production and supply of electricity, heat, gas and water 1,498 0.832 1,247 4.60 
Construction 4,663 0.429 2,000 7.38 
Wholesale and retail trades 6,619 0.251 1,659 6.12 
Transport, storage and post 3,049 0.540 1,645 6.07 
Hotels and catering services 1,215 0.146 178 0.66 
Information transmission, software and information technology 1,855 0.5 927 3.42 
Financial intermediation 5,787 0.9 5,209 19.22 
Real estate 4,170 0.323 1,348 4.97 
Leasing and business services 1,711 0.7 1,198 4.42 
Scientific research and technical services 1,348 0.295 398 1.47 
Management of water conservancy, environm. and public facilities 385 0.9 347 1.28 
Service to households, repair and other services 1,085 0.5 543 2.00 
Education 2,425 0.9 2,183 8.05 
Health and social services 1,496 0.9 1,346 4.97 
Culture, sports and entertainment 493 0.7 345 1.27 
Public management, social security and social organizations 2,662 1 2,662 9.82 
Sum of sectors 68,905 27,102  
Share in PRC GDP (in %)  39.33  
GDP = gross domestic product; SOSCE = state-owned and state-controlled enterprise (category). 
For explanations on the derivations of the assumed sector-specific SOSCE shares see Appendix 1.  
Sources: GDP and sector value-added data are from Statistical Yearbook 2017. Data relevant to calculating 
the assumed sector SOSCE shares are from Statistical Yearbook 2016, and 2017. 
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almost two-thirds of profit (unchanged from 2009, the first year these data are available). 
25. Both the return on equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA) declined continuously over 
time, with ROE falling from 12.4% in 2006 to 4.8% in 2016, and ROA in the same period falling 
from 4.4% to 1.6%. Some of this decline in profitability can be traced to a relative increase in 
losses: the profit of profitable enterprises relative to the losses of loss-making enterprises halved, 
from 4.48% to 2.31%.   
26. The question that arises is whether the decline in profitability reflects a “real” decline in profits, 
or whether, for example, the introduction of the state capital budget management system 
(explained below)—with the new requirement to submit an increasing part of profits to SASAC or 
provincial ASACs—provides incentives for enterprises to report less profit.  
 
 
Table 3: Number of State Enterprises and their Performance (Finance Ministry 
Data) 
Number of enterpr. Assets Equity Profit ROE ROA Profit / 
Total Total Central Local Central losses 
Central Local share share  share  
(th.) (th.) (th.) (CNY 
bn) 
(%) (%) (CNY 
bn) 
(CNY 
bn) 
(%) (%) (%)  
2006 116 21 96 27,731 51.7 53.4 9,801 1,219 12.4 4.4 4.48
2007 112 22 90 34,707 54.2 50.1 14,460 1,744 12.1 5.0 5.62
2008 110 22 88 41,622 55.2 48.9 16,621 1,334 8.0 3.2 3.04
2009 111 25 86 51,414 54.3 49.6 19,872 1,561 62.3 7.9 3.0 3.90
2010 114 26 87 64,021 51.6 48.4 23,417 2,143 63.4 9.2 3.3 4.41
2011 136 41 94 75,908 50.6 49.4 27,299 2,467 61.6 9.0 3.2 3.68
2012 147 48 99 89,489 48.5 51.5 31,975 2,428 65.8 7.6 2.7 3.11
2013 155 52 104 104,095 46.7 53.3 36,997 2,557 65.3 6.9 2.5 3.03
2014 161 54 106 118,472 45.6 54.4 41,876 2,644 65.9 6.3 2.2 2.82
2015 167 56 111 140,683 46.0 54.0 48,241 2,497 65.8 5.2 1.8 2.44
2016 174 57 116 154,914 45.6 54.4 53,393 2,556 62.3 4.8 1.6 2.31
ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity; Profit / Losses = profit of profitable enterprises divided by 
losses of loss-making enterprises; th. = thousand. 
Notes:  
1. The source provides enterprise numbers rounded to the thousands. 
2. Central and local asset shares of 2006-2009 do not add up to total assets. 
3. Profit of profitable enterprises plus losses (negative profit) of loss-making enterprises equals (total, all) 
profit.  
4. The source does not break down profit into profit by central and local enterprises. Limited data on profit by 
central enterprises are available separately. 
5. Additional information: In 2015, “centrally administered enterprises” accounted for 72.7% of assets in 
central state enterprises, and “central departmentally administered enterprises” for 27.3%. For profit, the 
shares were 75.3% and 24.7%, respectively.  
Sources: Fiscal Yearbook 2016, pp. 375, 377, 378, 386f., Fiscal Yearbook 2017, pp. 366, 368, 369, 377f. 
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Table 4: State Enterprises by Sector (2015, Finance Ministry Data) 
 Number 
of 
Share 
of all 
Share 
of 
Share 
of 
Share 
of 
Share of 
formal 
ROE ROA 
 enter- enter- assets equity profits employ-    prises prises ment   
 (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
National total 167,399 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 5.2 1.8 
1. Agriculture 6,954 4.2 0.8 0.8 0.1 7.2 0.9 0.3 
  1.1 Farming 3,033 1.8 0.5 0.5 0.1 4.7 1.3 0.4 
  1.2 Forestry 1,546 0.9 0.1 0.1 0.0 1.8 0.1 0.0 
  1.3 Husbandry 712 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.3 0.5 
  1.4 Fishery 321 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -2.9 -1.0 
  1.5 Implicit residual 1,342 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.1 0.4 
2. Industry 42,816 25.6 27.2 32.5 30.3 48.4 4.8 2.0 
  2.1 Coal 2,422 1.4 2.7 2.3 -3.3 8.3 -7.5 -2.2 
  2.2 Petroleum, petrochemicals 771 0.5 3.2 7.2 4.4 5.3 3.2 2.4 
  2.3 Metallurgical industry 2,596 1.6 3.4 2.6 -6.2 5.5 -12.4 -3.3 
  2.4 Building materials 2,959 1.8 0.7 0.7 0.4 1.7 2.8 1.0 
  2.5 Chemical industry 3,081 1.8 1.5 1.3 0.4 3.1 1.6 0.5 
  2.6 Forest industry 153 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 1.8 0.2 
  2.7 Foods 2,015 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.8 6.3 2.0 
  2.8 Tobacco 146 0.1 0.6 1.4 4.5 0.6 16.2 12.6 
  2.9 Textiles 485 0.3 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.5 1.8 0.6 
  2.10 Pharmaceuticals 864 0.5 0.3 0.4 1.0 0.8 12.3 7.2 
  2.11 Machinery industry 7,646 4.6 3.3 4.0 7.9 7.4 10.2 4.2 
    of which: automobiles 1,317 0.8 1.3 1.9 6.1 2.5 16.8 8.3 
  2.12 Electronics 1,844 1.1 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.8 6.2 2.8 
  2.13 Power industry 7,126 4.3 6.9 6.9 14.5 5.8 10.9 3.7 
  2.14 Municipal public goods/utilities 5,525 3.3 1.6 1.9 1.5 2.4 4.2 1.7 
  2.15 Other industry 5,183 3.1 1.9 2.4 3.5 4.4 7.6 3.3 
3. Construction 10,343 6.2 7.1 6.1 6.6 7.4 5.6 1.6 
4. Geological prosp., water conserve. 1,714 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.1 0.4 0.6 0.4 
5. Transport and storage 17,152 10.2 13.4 14.1 6.9 13.4 2.5 0.9 
  5.1 Railway transport 1,317 0.8 4.6 4.8 0.4 5.4 0.5 0.2 
  5.2 Road transport 4,300 2.6 4.9 5.1 1.1 5.1 1.1 0.4 
  5.3 Water transport 1,580 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.4 0.6 6.5 3.1 
  5.4 Air transport 632 0.4 0.9 1.1 1.5 0.9 6.6 3.1 
  5.5 Storage 7,224 4.3 1.6 0.6 0.5 0.9 3.8 0.5 
  5.6 Implicit residual 2,099 1.3 0.8 1.3 2.0 0.7 7.9 4.7 
6. Post and telecommunications 1,428 0.9 2.6 4.5 7.4 4.6 8.5 5.2 
7. Trade and catering 25,317 15.1 4.7 4.1 12.0 5.9 15.2 4.6 
8. Real estate 16,152 9.6 9.9 8.0 8.7 2.2 5.6 1.6 
9. Information technology services 2,008 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.6 12.3 5.3 
10. Social services 26,232 15.7 16.8 23.2 11.8 5.5 2.6 1.2 
11. Health, sports, welfare 800 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.3 1.4 0.6 
12. Education, culture, broadcasting 6,139 3.7 0.5 1.0 1.4 1.2 7.4 4.5 
13. Scientific research, techn. services 8,111 4.8 1.0 1.2 2.5 2.0 11.3 4.5 
14. (Administrative) organs, mass 
organizations, and others 2,233 1.3 15.1 3.2 11.2 1.1 18.5 1.3 
Source: Fiscal Yearbook 2016, pp. 388, 390, 392, 394, 395. Data are also available for the years 2009-2014. 
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27. Table 4 presents some of the limited industry (economic sector) data available from the 
Finance Ministry (in greatest possible industry detail), for 2015. Approximately one-quarter of 
state enterprises are located in “industry” (mining, manufacturing, utilities), accounting for one-
quarter of state assets, one-third of state equity and profit, and for almost half of SOE 
employment. ROE and ROA differ drastically across industries. For example, the metallurgical 
industry has an ROE of -12.4%, while the tobacco industry has an ROE of 16.2%. The highest 
ROE is found in “Administrative organs, mass organizations, and others,” at 18.5% (although 
the ROA is at best mediocre).  
 
III. STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISE REFORMS 
28. By the early 1990s, the decline in state-owned enterprise (SOE) profitability had become a 
matter of concern. Attempts at sector-specific SOE reforms did not yield the desired success and 
by 1997 it had become clear that more SOE reforms were needed. Profitability was the driving 
factor. In March 1998 at the National People’s Congress, incoming Premier Zhu Rongji in 
discussing SOE reform, announced “there is no more money” (meiyou qian).  
29. Reforming SOEs took many forms, not least of which was laying off vast numbers of workers. 
But in the long run, a complete restructuring was pursued of how state ownership of means of 
production is organized. The establishment of the State(-owned) Asset Supervision and 
Administration Commission (SASAC) and its provincial counterparts (provincial ASACs) followed 
in 2003. While this reorganization solved some SOE problems, it could not resolve all governance 
issues. 
30. By the late 2000s, the role of SOEs in the economy had changed. While a very few economic 
sectors (such as the petroleum industry, tobacco, the telecommunications industry, and banking) 
remained confined to state ownership, most economic sectors had no ownership restrictions. At 
the same time, economic policies of transition and reform gave way to industrial policies 
irrespective of state or private ownership form (but with a distinction between domestic vs. foreign 
ownership). 
31. In the 2010s, SOE reform became more a matter of tying up loose ends rather than initiating 
major new reform measures, and even that was a haltingly implemented undertaking. Apart from 
(Chinese Communist) “Party building” in SOEs, three elements of SOE reform rose to prominence: 
mixed ownership reform, a new state capital management system, and continued implementation 
of the ‘modern enterprise system.’  
A. State-owned Enterprise Reform Program of 1998-2000  
32. The First Plenum of the 15th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) at its 
meeting on 19 September 1997 initiated a three-year SOE reform program (1998-2000) which 
laid the foundation for state ownership in the PRC today. Two slogans summarized the reform 
program (SETC, 28 November 1997).  
33. The first slogan was “seize the big ones and let go of the small ones” (zhuada fangxiao). For 
large and medium(-sized) SOEs, i.e., the “big ones,” the reform program had two major objectives: 
most large and medium-sized SOEs were to adopt the modern enterprise system, and most loss-
making large and medium-sized SOEs were to “escape their difficulties” (tuokun). Small SOEs, 
mostly owned by local governments, were to be “enlivened” (gaohuo) by any means necessary 
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to improve their finances.11  
34. The modern enterprise system encompasses four elements:  
 clearly allocated property rights,  
 clear rights and responsibilities,  
 separation of government and enterprise, and  
 scientific management.  
Key to the establishment of the modern enterprise system is the gradual switch to the company 
system, in accordance with the Company Law passed in December 1993 (NPC, 29 December 
1993, since amended three times, in 1999, 2004, and 2013). The Company Law established a 
regulatory framework for limited liability companies—with the sub-category of solely state-owned 
limited liability companies—and stock companies. (But, as further discussed below, while 
corporatization may achieve the first goal of clearly allocating property rights, it is less effective in 
clearly allocating rights and responsibilities, and perhaps least effective in separating government 
and enterprises.) Adoption of the modern enterprise system is nearing completion only today. 
35. The second slogan was “three reforms and one enhancement” (san gai yi jiaqiang):  
 reducing employment in SOEs while trying to create re-employment opportunities,  
 increasing SOE equity relative to debt,  
 letting some SOEs go bankrupt or merging them with other enterprises,  
 and enhancing enterprise management.  
These reforms required supporting measures. The three-year SOE reform program was 
accompanied by a complete overhaul of the social security system. Traditionally, all social security 
tasks were concentrated within an SOE. These tasks were now shifted to external institutions for 
SOE reform, including enterprise bankruptcy, to proceed unencumbered.12 A provincial-level 
pension system was established in 1997, a new urban medical insurance system in 1998, and a 
municipal-level unemployment insurance system in 1999. 
36. One effect of economic reforms was the increasing indebtedness of SOEs as the state budget 
no longer provided investment funds and working capital and firms were directed to banks for 
loans. By the mid-1990s, industrial SOEs’ average liability-asset ratio, or “debt-asset ratio,” had 
reached about 65%. The government resorted to debt-equity swaps and established resolution 
trust companies to reduce the debt burden of viable SOEs. A debt-equity swap of CNY 460bn—
equal to approximately 5% of total SOE industrial assets in 2000—was announced in 2000 for 
601 predominantly large, centrally owned industrial SOEs (but most likely only implemented in 
2001 and 2002). In addition, each of the four big state commercial banks in the PRC set up an 
                                                 
11 Reform of small SOEspredominantly owned by local governments and in 1997 accounting for barely 15% of 
industrial SOE value-addedwas left to local governments. Governments across the PRC began to experiment with a 
host of reform measures for small industrial SOEs. These included the sale of small SOEs to their employees (adoption 
of the “stock cooperative” system), the merger of two or more SOEs, the take-over of one or more small SOEs by a 
larger SOE, the transfer of profitable production processes into new SOEs while letting the old ones go bankrupt, the 
leasing of complete SOEs or some of their assets, privatization, the creation of joint ventures with foreign enterprises, 
and bankruptcy. 
12 Average annual employment in industrial SOEs by one account halved from 40.40mio in 1997 to 20.96mio in 
2000. Employment in all SOEs fell by 25.5m between 1998 and 2001 (SC, April 2002, p. 41). The safety net for 
dismissed workers began with “re-employment service centers” (three years), followed by unemployment insurance 
(two years) and eventually a “basic living allowance.” 
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asset management company to in 2000 take over CNY 930bn of bad loans from the four banks.13 
37. At the time of the SOE reform program, the PRC did not have a uniform enterprise bankruptcy 
law (which only came into effect in June 2007). The State Council in 1997 established a “national 
leading group for SOE mergers and bankruptcies and staff and worker re-employment” to 
formulate annual bankruptcy plans for SOEs that would be socially and financially feasible. The 
national leading group between 1997 and 2000 approved (or planned) the merger or bankruptcy 
of 5,335 industrial SOEs, which required writing off CNY 208.64bn in bank loans (principal and 
interest due). By 2000, of the 6,599 large and medium-sized loss-making industrial SOEs in 1997, 
1,415 had merged, had entered bankruptcy proceedings, or were closed.14 Mergers were clearly 
the favored procedure, while planned/policy bankruptcies continued well into the 2000s (and “last” 
bankruptcies were still under discussion in the mid-2010s). 
38. Enhancing enterprise management falls under the larger heading of improving corporate 
governance (how to ensure that managers of the firm act in the interests of the owners, or, in a 
larger context, the stakeholders). While privatization may be viewed as a simple method to align 
the interests of enterprise managers with those of the owners, privatization of SOEs in the PRC 
was pursued only for small SOEs and heavily restricted for larger SOEs. 
39.  The 1998-2000 SOE reform program ended the “iron rice bowl” of guaranteed lifelong 
employment in SOEs. After almost fifty years, the concept of SOEs as one’s “work unit” (danwei) 
which ruled all aspects of life from schooling to housing, health care and pensions dissolved within 
just three years. The introduction of the company system—modeled on Western company laws—
and the introduction of a society-wide social security system were to profoundly change how 
SOEs are managed. SOEs were to be separate from the state and to be run as modern 
companies. But by 2003 it had become apparent that some form of institutional oversight over 
SOEs was still needed.  
B. State Asset Supervision and Administration Commission, From 2003 Onward 
40.  Hand in hand with the SOE reform program of 1998-2000, a major administrative 
restructuring cut the central government’s staff by half and abolished most line ministries, with 
some of their functions shifted to departments of the State/National Development and Reform 
Commission (NDRC, the successor to the State Planning Commission) and the State Economic 
and Trade Commission (merged into the Ministry of Commerce in 2003). In 2003, the State(-
owned) Asset Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) was established to, on 
behalf of the State Council, supervise and administer centrally owned (non-financial) SOEs. 
Corresponding provincial ASACs were set up shortly thereafter, not only replicating the new 
administrative structure at the center, but through the explicit existence of central SASAC vs. local 
ASACs also clearly subordinating SOEs either to the center or a locality.  
41. By the end of 2003, SASAC was in charge of 196 (non-financial) conglomerates, i.e., large 
holding companies that themselves owned multiple subsidiaries. Industrial conglomerates 
dominate the list of SASAC’s SOEs—with 34,280 state-owned and state-controlled industrial 
enterprises alone (Industry Statistical Yearbook 2003, p. 54)—but the list also includes the three 
                                                 
13 For comparison, total loans by all financial institutions in the PRC (at the time, predominantly loans extended 
by the four banks) at end-2001 amounted to CNY 11.2trn (Statistical Yearbook 2003, p. 704). The four asset 
management companies each received CNY 10bn in start-up capital from the government and were otherwise financed 
by bonds guaranteed by the Finance Ministry, as well as an unknown volume of refinancing from the People’s Bank of 
China. The objective was to dispose of the bad loans within a ten-year framework, which was largely achieved, albeit 
at a low recovery rate (precise data are unavailable, various sources suggest a recovery rate of 10-25%). 
14 See China Infobank (25 June 2001) and Fiscal Yearbook 2001, p. 109.  
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major airlines and the three telecommunications firms. In 2005, SASAC organized 21 sectoral 
restructuring programs as well as a “final” round of policy-related bankruptcies of large enterprises. 
By late 2018, the number of SASAC conglomerates had shrunk to 97, mostly through mergers 
(with 124,966 individual enterprises in 2015 (Table 1)).15 
42. SASAC played an important role in three subsequent SOE-related reforms.16 The first was 
management buyouts (MBOs) at small and medium-sized SOEs in the mid-2000s. A rise in MBO 
activity in 2004 triggered concerns about “insider privatization” and “asset stripping” and led to 
investigative teams being dispatched and MBO activity being slowed down; MBOs of large SOEs 
were blocked. By 14 April 2005, SASAC issued comprehensive regulations on MBOs at small and 
medium-sized SOEs, establishing types and conditions of transactions, requiring transactions to 
be conducted in transparent fashion on provincial property rights markets, and setting principles 
for the calculation of minimum prices. This means that SASAC regularized what de facto was a 
rather unregulated privatization of small and medium-sized SOEs, primarily affecting locally 
owned SOEs. Apart from MBOs at small and medium-sized SOEs in the mid-2000s, full-scale 
privatization has never been an option. Listing on the stock market, however, became a major 
venue for attracting private capital. 
43. A second SOE-related reform was the transformation of originally non-tradable state shares 
of listed SOEs into tradable shares. In 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) 
implemented a sell-off of state shares that triggered a massive market decline and was 
subsequently stopped. In 2005, SASAC supported a second attempt by the CSRC to transform 
non-tradable state shares into tradable shares. This second round was conducted on a company-
by-company basis (requiring approval by a two-thirds majority of public shareholders) and 
typically involved giving private shareholders 3 bonus shares for every 10 tradable shares they 
held, while government holders of non-tradable shares had to agree to sell no more than a small 
proportion of their shares during a 3-year lockup period. SASAC’s role in the transformation was 
that of the owner of SOEs, pursuing the smallest possible dilution of the value of state holdings.  
44. The third reform was the introduction of the state capital management budget (guoyou ziben 
jingying yusuan) in 2007. For the first time since a 1994 tax reform, SOEs were again being asked 
to surrender profit—albeit only a small share thereof. (SOEs have since 1994 paid corporate 
income taxes and continue to do so.) In 2007, SASAC enterprises were newly subjected to three 
levels of profit remittances: 17 firms plus the State Tobacco Monopoly faced a 10% profit 
remittance rate; 99 firms a 5% rate; 32 firms were exempted from any profit remittance for three 
years (mostly military industrial firms and research institutes); and the grain and the cotton reserve 
companies were permanently exempted. Local ASACs proceeded similarly for their enterprises. 
The new charge on profits was accompanied (and partly offset) by a lowering of the corporate 
income tax rate from 33% to 25% on 1 January 2008 (increasing residual profits), but also by the 
elimination of some previously enjoyed tax breaks (reducing profits).  
45. The profit remittance rates were subsequently adjusted at least twice (first time in 2011). By 
2014, the State Tobacco Monopoly paid a 25% profit remittance rate, most big SOEs 15% or 20%, 
and all others at least 10% (with 2 firms, presumably still the grain and the cotton reserve 
companies, being exempted). The profit is remitted to the Finance Ministry in the first instance, 
which then redistributes the funds to SASAC. SASAC’s primary use of these funds has been for 
capital outlays, restructuring, and general “reform costs,” i.e., the remittances likely are being 
used to cover the losses and restructuring costs of SOEs. The profit remittance rate is expected 
to rise to 30%. 
                                                 
15 For the most up-to-date list of SASAC conglomerates, see the SASAC homepage (www.sasac.gov.cn).  
16 This and the following two paragraphs draw on Naughton (2005, 2008). 
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C. Disparate Strands of State-owned Enterprise Policy in the 2010s 
46. By the late 2000s, SOE reforms were deemed to have been broadly completed. Policy 
makers’ attention shifted to industrial policy as a tool to maintain the economic growth momentum. 
Industrial policy made little distinction between SOEs and non-SOEs. The new Party leadership 
that came to power in 2012 then considered further, minor SOE reform measures but without 
decisive advances. By 2018, Party Secretary Xi Jinping repeatedly issued a renewed commitment 
to significant state ownership. All along, a key concern for the new leadership was strengthening 
Party control over SOEs.  
Industrial policy  
47. In 2010, the State Council identified seven “strategic emerging industries” which were to be 
supported in the following years, with a target share in gross domestic product (GDP) for 2015 of 
8%, and for 2020 of 15%. The seven industries are:  
 energy saving and environmental protection technologies, 
 next generation information technology, 
 biotechnology, 
 high-end equipment manufacturing, 
 new energy, 
 new materials, and 
 new energy vehicles.17 
While industrial policy historically refers to SOEs, this policy document explicitly encouraged non-
state (minjian) investment.  
48. The emerging industries policy was followed in 2015 by a State Council declaration on “Made 
in China 2025,” the PRC version of Germany’s 2012 “Industry 4.0” (fourth industrial revolution).18 
Breakthroughs are to occur in ten priority industries: information technology, numerical control 
tools and robotics, aerospace equipment, ocean engineering equipment and high-tech ships, 
railway equipment, energy saving and new energy vehicles, power equipment, new materials, 
medicines and medical devices, and agricultural machinery. State vs. private ownership is not an 
issue; “domestic vs. foreign” ownership is. 
49. “Made in China 2025” implies that the PRC government subsidizes domestic products while 
excluding foreign alternatives; it sets substitution targets for foreign products; it provides financial 
resources for various research and development funds that benefit domestic enterprises; it 
requests the transfer of foreign technology in exchange for domestic market access; it restricts 
access to public procurement for foreign firms and limits the possibility for inbound foreign direct 
investment; it controls crucial technologies such as encryption devices and codes, and through 
its Cyber Security Law of 2016 ensures easy access for the state (and thereby possibly its 
enterprises) to the data of international companies operating in the PRC.19  The ownership 
structures are often hidden, with seemingly private enterprises (especially those investing abroad) 
                                                 
17 For an English language summary of the State Council document see The US-China Business Council (2013).  
18 The four revolutions are: water- and steam-powered mechanical manufacturing, mass production based on 
electric power, automation of manufacturing based on information technology, and cyber-physical systems (smart 
factories with embedded information technology systems). 
19 See, for example, Wuebbeke et al. (2016). 
 
 
   19 
 
ultimately under state control.20  
50. In June 2018, censors informed all state media agencies to avoid mentioning “Made in China 
2025” in their reports. This followed concerns in the United States (U.S.) and in Europe about the 
acquisition of technology by PRC firms, business concerns that the program would discriminate 
against foreign firms in the PRC, and U.S. President Trump’s explicit criticism of PRC industrial 
policy. Subsequently, mentioning of the program on the Ministry of Commerce website dropped 
drastically and PRC sources claimed that “Made in China 2025” involved no personnel, budget, 
or resource allocations and was simply a visionary document. Other sources report that in the 
chosen pilot cities for “Made in China 2025,” earlier regional development plans were being 
translated into “Made in China 2025” terms and funds were being disbursed rather indiscriminately, 
including for projects that do not necessarily have much relation to the center’s industrial policy 
intentions.21  
51. Another industrial policy initiative is the “supply-side structural reform” agenda first introduced 
by the Finance and Economics Leading Small Group of the Party Central Committee in November 
2015,22 primarily intended to curb excess capacity, independent of ownership form. The agenda’s 
five elements are: eliminating excess capacity, especially in steel and coal production; reducing 
stocks, mostly in real estate in second- and third-tier cities; de-leveraging across the economy; 
lowering costs, including those due to taxes, regulations, and social security contributions; and a 
broad catch-all call for “strengthening weak points.”  
52. The agenda applies independent of ownership form. But with SOEs accounting for between 
half and three-quarters of total assets by above-norm industrial enterprises in three relevant 
industries (coal mining, ferrous metals mining and dressing, and the ferrous metals smelting and 
rolling processing industry), SOEs are a prime target of the supply-side structural reform agenda. 
The agenda provides a nod to publicly owned firms to merge and become more efficient (i.e., it 
tasks SASAC with resolving a particular problem among its enterprises). It also encourages local 
officials to implement environmental and other regulations and to eliminate the least desirable 
production capacities, independent of ownership form.23 To the extent that the reach of central 
authority into central institutions (SASAC and its SOEs) is stronger than into provinces, the 
supply-side structural reform agenda affects primarily large, central SOEs. Since oversupply 
means low profitability, the supply-side structural reform agenda can also be viewed as a program 
to address poor SOE performance in certain sectors. 
State-owned enterprise reforms since the Third Plenum of 2013 
53. The Third Plenum of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Central Committee (CCPCC) on 12 
November 2013 issued a lengthy decision on major issues in deepening reform that included 
paragraphs elaborating on SOE reforms (CCPCC, 12 November 2013). The decision followed the 
                                                 
20 Private entrepreneur Li Shufu (of car manufacturer Geely) insists when questioned by German media about his 
newly acquired stake in German car maker Daimler that he is a private entrepreneur with no ties to the PRC authorities. 
In PRC state media he is reported as saying that the purchase of the stake in Daimler was to “support the growth of 
the Chinese auto industry” and to “serve our national strategies.” The purchase of the stake in Daimler must have been 
approved (if not ordered) by the PRC’s top leadership. (See Wuebbekke et al, 2016, and Chazan, 13 March 2018) 
21 See, for example, Leng and Zheng (26 June 2018) and Wang (10 July 2018).  
22 Articles by an “authoritative personage” in Renmin ribao (People’s Daily) on 4 January 2016 and on 9 May 2016 
widely promoted the supply-side structural reform agenda. Naughton (2016a,b) elaborates on the supply-side structural 
reform agenda. 
23  The agenda promotes particular actions rather than commands closures, leaving much flexibility in 
implementation. It came at a time of declining profitability and increasing losses due to plummeting prices for coal and 
steel, and promotes market-conforming behavior while maintaining a legal framework that applies to all firms. 
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standard pattern of long sentences of what is to be “promoted” or “strengthened,” etc., with each 
sentence consisting of a list of half a dozen or more items. Three themes stand out in this Third 
Plenum decision: the development of a mixed ownership economy, improvements to the state-
owned asset management system, and full-scale adoption of the modern enterprise system. 
These three themes have dominated the SOE reform discussion since, and have led to numerous 
experiments and further developments.  
54. The Third Plenum decision was followed by “guiding opinions for deepening SOE reform” 
issued by the CCPCC in conjunction with the State Council two years later (CCPCC 24 August 
2015). The Guiding Opinions reiterated the earlier statements, elaborated on SOE reform in 
hundreds of declarations of what was to be done, and set a deadline of 2020 to establish the 
state-owned asset management system, the modern enterprise system, and the market-oriented 
“operation mechanisms.”24 Key items listed include the following: to complete the reform of SOEs, 
make progress on developing the mixed economy, improve the corporate governance structure, 
improve state-owned asset supervision, improve the allocative efficiency of state capital, and 
strengthen Party building in enterprises. SOEs are to be relieved of “social functions” and 
“problems of history.” SOEs are to be divided into commercial businesses (whose focus is to be 
performance, value preservation and increase, and market competitiveness) and public welfare 
enterprises. 25  In the case of commercial SOEs, those in national security and in “lifeline” 
businesses must be state-controlled. By 2020, 30% of state-owned capital gains are to be turned 
over to the Finance Ministry for “people’s livelihood” purposes. 
55. The fact that it took two years to issue Guiding Opinions reflects difficulty in reaching an 
understanding on what to do about SOEs. Naughton (2016b) reports of 34 SOE-related initiatives 
in early 2014, proposed by various government organizations—from SASAC to the Ministry of 
Finance, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), and the Ministry of Labor—
typically with differing views of how to proceed.  
56.In the end, much decision-making power was concentrated in Party leading groups. Thus, 
already in 2013, Party Secretary Xi Jinping created a Central Leading Group for Comprehensively 
Deepening Reform, chaired by himself, with a specialized subgroup for Economic System and 
Ecological Civilization System Reform. The de facto headquarters of the latter was the staff office 
of the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs (headed by Liu He, key economic 
advisor to Xi Jinping). This staff office then became the highest authority for developing SOE 
reform measures, largely bypassing the NDRC and SASAC (Leutert 2018a). Consequently, the 
Guiding Opinions were issued by the CCPCC (in conjunction with the State Council). But because 
a Party leading group was handling SOE reform, the Guiding Opinions remained vague and 
lacked the support of the bureaucracy that would be needed for implementation and 
experimentation. 
57. From 2015 to late 2018, numerous distinct reform measures have been issued by the State 
Council, SASAC, Ministry of Finance, and other central organs, most recently at the rate of about 
three per month. These tend to be “opinions,’ “interim measures,” “views,” and “guidance” rather 
than major reform documents. Together, they amount to “1+N” SOE reform strategy documents: 
the Guiding Opinions and an a priori undetermined number of policy documents of various 
                                                 
24 An introductory paragraph reads “The reform of state-owned enterprises must follow the rules of the market 
economy and the business development law, adhere to the separation of government functions from enterprise 
management, the separation of government’s public affairs management function from its state-owned asset 
management function, and the separation of ownership from the right of management [etc.].” 
25 SASAC (30 December 2015) elaborates on this binary distinction. The finance sector and “culture” are explicitly 
subjected to “other regulations.”  
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degrees of specificity.26  
58. The first of the three SOE reform themes, mixed ownership reform, has two aspects: (i) 
Investment by the non-state economy in the state economy and vice versa, and (ii) employee 
share ownership. On both dimensions, developments are slow, especially on employee share 
ownership where developments seem to not have progressed beyond experimentation.  
59. The Guiding Opinions of 2015 suggest the introduction of mixed ownership conducive to 
transformation and upgrading particularly in the fields of petroleum, natural gas, electricity, railway, 
telecommunications, resource development and public utilities, though this list appears flexible 
across different official documents. Investment by the non-state economy in SOEs so far has 
mostly been interpreted as the result of government arm-twisting, such as when the government 
“successfully pressured Baidu, Tencent, Alibaba, and JD.com to invest in a restructuring of state-
owned telecom operator China Unicom” (Wang and Xie, 2018).  
60. Beyond equity ownership, the mixed-ownership concept also includes various forms of co-
operation, such as “military-civil fusion” (junmin ronghe) introduced by Xi Jinping in 2015, with 
inefficiency in the military sector triggering a call for private enterprises to collaborate with the 
military while opening military research facilities for civilian use.27  Another aspect of mixed 
ownership is public-private partnerships (PPPs). The NDRC maintains a webpage with a list of 
current projects;28 the take-up seems low, with only a handful of projects in each province. Miura 
(2015, p. 22) reports on local experiments and concludes from specific evidence on power 
transmission and distribution pilot projects in Inner Mongolia, in which another aspect is the 
intended separation of power production and distribution, that "the government is more interested 
in the use of PPPs to expand investment than in the separation of network maintenance and 
operations, indicating the reform process is tending to flow along the line of least resistance.”  
61.  The second of the three SOE reform themes, establishment of a state-owned asset 
management system, concerns the reorganization of large state-owned holding companies into 
(or the creation of) formal state-owned capital management companies, which would allow the 
government to, as investor, focus solely on supervision. The result is little different from the current 
structure of “SASAC – state-owned holding companies (or very large SOEs) – individual SOEs or 
companies,” except that the state-owned holding companies (or newly “state-owned capital 
management companies”) gain more formal authority with clearly assigned tasks. Thus, some 
such state-owned capital management companies might function along the lines of Singapore’s 
Temasek Holdings (a government financial investment company) with maximizing shareholder 
returns as sole objective. Other state-owned capital management companies may have different 
                                                 
26 Citi (2018) provides an overview of recent documents. The issues range widely and include the following: 
experiments with employment stock ownership plans in financial institutions (though development and policy banks are 
to remain fully state-owned, and the state continues to hold a controlling share in large and influential financial 
institutions); improved supervision of listed SOEs and of transactions involving state-owned assets; improvements to 
corporate governance; CNY 500bn will be used for debt-equity swaps, advancing mixed ownership forms, and 
facilitating deleveraging; further reorganization of central SOEs and further reforms in the oil and gas industry; 
clarification of the function and classification of SOEs; and removal of social functions and historical burdens. 
27 This is a particularly sensitive topic for private technology firms that sell internationally and may be sanctioned 
abroad for collaborating with the PRC military. Thus, U.S. security agencies warn telecommunication firms against 
using equipment from Huawei, while Australia banned Huawei and ZTE from providing 5G technology to mobile phone 
networks in Australia (Bond, 24 October 2018).  
28 See http://tzs.ndrc.gov.cn/zttp/PPPxmk/xmk/, accessed 7 October 2018. 
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objectives, especially those providing public goods.29  
62. The reduction in the number of SASAC companies from the current 97 to approximately 30-
50 by 2020-2022 appears to be moving along similar lines if the remaining companies are then 
reshaped into state-owned capital management companies. But a key issue is the missing 
progress in the classification of existing SOEs by function, which would then allow function-
specific policies, from profit maximization to “safeguarding” a national interest or the provision of 
public goods.30 
63. The third of the three SOE reform themes, establishment of the modern enterprise system, 
is in part a continuation of a theme reaching back to the 1998-2000 SOE reform program. The 
last SOEs that have not yet become formal companies are to do so, thus subjecting all SOEs to 
the Company Law. But “modern enterprise system” also refers to corporate governance, including 
management assessment criteria, and a discussion of in what sectors state-owned capital should 
be concentrated. This has led to a variety of reform measures. For example, individual ministries 
and government departments have decided to relax ownership restrictions in sectors under their 
administration; private enterprises have begun to enter the fringes of the mobile 
telecommunications market, while the three national airlines (Air China, China Eastern, and China 
Southern) face increasing competition from new low-cost carriers that are no longer limited to 
provincial state-owned airlines.  
64. A multitude of other SOE reform measures that do not necessarily fit one of these bigger 
themes exist. For example, SASAC has required central SOEs to reduce their average asset-
liability ratio by 2 percentage points by 2020, a measure that is being viewed as rather difficult to 
achieve.31  
Role of the Chinese Communist Party 
65. The role of the Party in SOE reform was one of the key tenets of the 2015 Guiding Opinions 
as well as the exclusive topic of a separate document (“Various Opinions”), issued almost 
simultaneously in 2015 (CCPCC, September 2015). The key phrase on the role of the Party is to 
“give full play to the political core role (zhengzhi hexin zuoyong) of the Party organization in SOEs,” 
or, in a variation, “to give full play to the core role of the party leadership and the core role of the 
party committee.” The political core role of the Party organization in SOEs is a commonplace 
historical theme that has become more strident in recent years.32 
66. An article authored by the SASAC Party committee and published in Qiushi, a Party journal, 
on 31 May 2016 cites Party Secretary Xi Jinping as emphasizing “Strengthening the Party is most 
fundamental to unswervingly make SOEs stronger, better, and bigger,” and “The priority in SOE 
reform is to adhere to Party leadership, otherwise it is not socialism with Chinese characteristics.” 
The article goes on to say that the Party’s leadership must not be outside the corporate 
governance structure. Instead: “We must guarantee and implement that the Party has the 
                                                 
29 Miura (2015) reports on extensive pilot programs in Shanghai which resulted in the creation (or re-labelling) of 
two state-owned capital investment companies, one in charge of financial institutions, and the other in charge of 
numerous non-financial companies. 
30 Miura (2015: 14) reports that SASAC has issued four requirements for companies to be restructured into state-
owned capital investment companies: (i) net sales of CNY10 billion–CNY50 billion; (ii) most of the subsidiaries must be 
listed companies; (iii) ample liquid capital; and (iv) must be a conglomerate. 
31 SASAC announced the measure in January 2018. The current ratio is 66%, compared to 54% in 2011. For 
details, see IMF (2018, p. 56) and Gatley (2018). 
32 See, for example, CCPCC, 31 October 2004, and in an accompaniment to the Third Plenum decision of 2013, 
in CCPCC Organization Department and SASAC Party Committee (2013). 
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following rights: to play the leading role in enterprise reform, to participate in major decisions, to 
play the leading role in the selection of important management cadres, to supervise the 
professional behavior of party members and cadres, to maintain the legitimate rights and interests 
of the workers, and to lead the ideological and political work and corporate culture.”  
67. In assessing the economic performance of an SOE, the SASAC supervision department is to 
equally consider the Party building work. The requirements of Party building work are to be 
included in the ‘charter’ of SOEs. The Party is in charge of cadre administration (dang guan ganbu), 
i.e., the Party is in charge of selecting and appointing key SOE personnel. Major SOE decisions 
must first be passed by the Party committee for suggestions. Party personnel in SOEs are to have 
the same rank and compensation as the management team. The expenses of Party work are born 
by the SOE. 
68. Later in 2016, the Xinhua News Agency cited Party Secretary Xi Jinping as stressing that by 
strengthening and improving Party leadership in SOEs, “SOEs become the Party, SOEs become 
the state’s most reliable pillar, SOEs become a major force in resolutely implementing Central 
Committee decisions and instructions, […,], a major force in implementing the important strategies 
of ‘Going Out’ and of ‘One Belt One Road’ […].” Xi Jinping continued with “Make SOEs strong, 
excellent, and big” (zuo qiang zuo you zuo da), “Ensure that the Party organ’s leadership and 
control over the selection and employment of SOE personnel will not change,” and “The Party’s 
leadership over SOEs is an organic and unified political, ideological, and organizational 
leadership.”33 
69. Xi Jinping’s emphasis on SOEs continues well into 2018. On 29 September 2018, Xi Jinping 
was reported as stating during a visit to an SOE: “Our SOEs should continue to become stronger, 
better and larger. […] All statements and arguments saying we don’t need SOEs any more or we 
should diminish SOEs are wrong and one-sided. […] Any thoughts or comments that doubt or 
bad-mouth SOEs are wrong” (Gan, 2018). 
70. Party influence in SOEs is not limited to matters such as participating in major decisions. As 
the 2015 Guiding Opinions state, “there should be some overlap between the management 
personnel and party leadership, chairman and general manager should be different people in 
principle, and the party secretary and chairman are usually the same person.” Leutert (2018a) 
confirms in an examination of core central SOEs that in more than 90% of these core central 
SOEs, the Party secretary simultaneously serves as chairman of the board of directors. It is often 
the case that deputy Party secretaries serve as managers and as chair and deputy chairs of the 
supervisory board, i.e., all decision-making as well as controlling and supervisory authority is 
concentrated in the SOE’s Party committee. Supervisory authority is also explicitly assigned (in 
the 2015 Guiding Opinions) not only to the Party committee but also to the (national) Party 
Disciplinary Commission cell that is attached to the Party committee.  
71. A relatively comprehensive example from the finance sector may illustrate the degree to 
which the formal mechanisms of corporate governance enshrined in the Company Law are 
supplemented by Party arrangements. The China Construction Bank, which is listed on the stock 
market, has a manager (chief executive officer [CEO]), a board of directors, and a supervisory 
board as stipulated in the company law for stock companies. It also has a Party cell. The manager 
(CEO) is the deputy Party secretary of the Party cell, and the three deputy managers are members 
of the Party cell (as are the internal auditor and the two assistants to the manager). The chair of 
the Board of Directors is the Party Secretary. The chair of the Supervisory Board is a second 
                                                 
33 The Party’s leadership role in SOEs (and its role in implementing Party policies in the non-public economy) is 
also enshrined in the Party Constitution (http://www.12371.cn/special/zggcdzc/zggcdzcqw/， accessed 8 October 
2018). 
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deputy Party Secretary.34 The bank’s Party cell is embedded in the larger Party organization, to 
which it reports and from which it receives instructions. 
72. The dominance of the Party within SOEs is in stark contrast to the policies of the 1980s and 
early 1990s to separate Party from government, and government from enterprises. While 
separation of government and enterprises is still on the agenda, the Party now directly controls 
the enterprises (and increasingly bypasses government via the assumption of government 
functions in Party leading groups).35 
73. The decision to formalize Party building by explicitly mentioning it in SOEs’ corporate charters 
has already borne fruit. As of early 2018, at least 30 SOEs listed in Hong Kong have changed 
their charters to give the Party a formal role in their governance.36 The dominance of the Party is 
also widely recognized in the press. Thus, Mitchell (24 October 2018a) in discussing the 
appointment of Sinochem Chairman Fank Ning Gaoning as simultaneous head of ChemChina (a 
competing group) without any reference to a potential merger between these two Global 500 
groups, writes: “The only stakeholder that matters in Chinese SOEs is the Communist party. Its 
opaque prerogatives trump everyone else’s.” 
74. The escalation of the U.S. trade war with the PRC in 2018 will likely only have strengthened 
the importance of SOEs to the PRC leadership and the importance of Party control over SOEs. 
When the U.S. is technologically in a position to at a moment’s notice destroy very large PRC 
firms—such as ZTE when the U.S. refused to supply the chips around which ZTE’s cell phones 
are built until a compromise was found—it is in the PRC leadership’s eminent interest to protect 
what it will view as a danger to national security and social stability, and establish a complete 
domestic industrial structure. The size of investments needed in, for example, the semiconductor 
industry and the (long) time horizon and the importance for the national economy will all favor to 
place such production under direct Party control, in state ownership, a tendency that will likely 
only become more pervasive with the U.S. trade war. 
75. The Party is also increasingly embedded in private companies.37 All companies in the PRC 
must have a Party committee. Many private companies share operations with the state; for 
example, the technology companies Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent have joint labs for research and 
development with state entities. Financing flows flexibly between the state and the private sector, 
such as when Xiaomi’s initial public offering is supported by state-owned entities as six of the 
seven anchor investors. The government protects domestic private enterprises against foreign 
competition, such as in the technology sector with the Great Firewall. Private enterprises, 
seemingly independent, cannot function without close co-operation with the government and 
thereby Party. 
                                                 
34 This particular bank example is chosen due to the details provided for this one case in the magazine Caijing, 
no. 131, 18 April 2005. 
35 The traditional “the Party administers the cadres” (dang guan ganbu), has, as McNally (2002) writes, become a 
“the Party administers everything” (dang guan yiqie). And as Leutert (2018a) points out, as of March 2018 the (Party) 
Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms was slated to become a Central Comprehensively 
Deepening Reforms Commission, i.e., the Party institution adopts a typical government label (“commission”) in a sign 
that it is directly exercising government functions. 
36 Leutert (2018a) mentions a January 2017 SASAC order for central SOEs to revise their corporate charters to 
include Party building, without, however, providing a source of the order (“Guanyu jiakuai tuijin zhongyang qiye dang 
jian gongzuo zongti yaoqiu naru gongsi zhangcheng youguran shixiang de tongzhi” (Circular on some matters regarding 
the acceleration and advancement of the general requirement to include central SOEs’ Party building in their charters)); 
an internet search for the circular was unsuccessful, as was a search of law databases. On the number of SOEs listed 
in Hong Kong that have already changed their charters see Schumpeter (2018). 
37 Also see, for example, Lucas (2018).  
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76. The emphasis on “stronger, better, bigger” and on Party control over SOEs has not gone 
unnoticed outside the PRC and has met with disapproval abroad and a call for a “level playing 
field.” Seemingly in response, Vice-Premier Liu He is reported in the English language press as 
having said at a conference on 9 October 2018 that it is “’utterly important’ to increase the vitality 
of state firms as ‘individual market players.’” The authority of SOEs’ boards of directors to make 
“significant decisions” pertaining to personnel and compensation was stressed, and minority 
shareholders are to be better protected.38 
 
IV. Case Study: Oil Industry39 
77.  In the PRC’s pre-reform economy, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry controlled all oil 
exploration, extraction and production through its subordinate SOEs. The ministry set prices for 
oil products and determined investment allocations, output targets, and product selection.  
A. Reform Stages 
78. Reforms in the oil industry proceeded in three stages. First, in the 1980s, line ministries were 
gradually abolished and their tasks shifted to holding companies, typically involving a transfer of 
personnel who retained their previous bureaucratic ranks. In the oil industry, the reform created 
three national oil companies (NOCs) based on an upstream-downstream distinction. Each 
company was designed as a holding company with formal ownership rights over the individual 
enterprises under its remit. 
79. In 1982, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) was created specifically to 
handle all offshore upstream activities. This included offshore exploration, extraction, production, 
and offshore cooperation with foreign oil companies. The CNOOC holds vice-ministerial rank.  
80.  In 1983, the China National Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) was created as a 
downstream oil company by merging enterprises with oil-related business that had formerly been 
under four ministries: petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, and light industry. Sinopec 
encompassed all petrochemical industry production, from crude oil refining to oil products, 
petrochemicals, chemical fertilizers, synthetic resigns, fibers and rubbers. Sinopec was placed 
under the direct supervision and control of the State Council and holds ministerial rank. Most of 
Sinopec’s production units were separate legal entities, each responsible for maintaining and 
increasing state assets. Sinopec was responsible, among others, for sector development plans, 
the pricing of oil products, and the allocation of crude oil to its subsidiaries. 
81.  In 1988, the Ministry of Petroleum Industry was reorganized into the China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), which from then on exercised control over the assets formerly 
under the ministry and took on many of the formerly ministerial functions. The CNPC was 
constrained to onshore upstream oil exploration, extraction, and production. The CNPC holds 
ministerial rank. 
                                                 
38 See Tang and Wang (10 October 2018). The Xinhua News Agency in a Chinese language article posted on the 
SASAC website (http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588025/n2588139/c9678422/content.html, accessed 12 October 2018) 
chose a somewhat different overall theme to describe what appears the same conference, with a focus on the “central 
position” of SOEs in the economy.  
39 This section is based on a multitude of sources. The academic literature provides the core information and 
perspectives (but is limited in detail). An English language overview over the development of the petroleum industry 
can be found in Nolan (2001a, 2014) and Taylor (2012). A large number of newspaper articles and web articles were 
consulted. Wikipedia at times served to counter-check details. 
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82. Most individual enterprises under these three NOCs were independent, incorporated legal 
persons which largely operated on their own. retained all profits, and entered into joint ventures 
with multinational companies. The largest of these enterprises developed their own reform plans 
and business strategies and floated on international stock markets. For example, Daqing (under 
the CNPC) in the 1990s endeavored to become a global corporation; this included a potential 
merger with Shanghai Petrochemical Company, a company under Sinopec, in order to combine 
upstream and downstream operations into a large national company. Daqing in 1997 accounted 
for two-thirds of the CNPC’s post-tax profits (with taxes remitted directly to the Finance Ministry 
[FM]). In the case of Sinopec, by end-1997 16 subordinate companies had been listed on 
domestic and international stock markets (Shanghai Petrochemcial Company in 1997 was the 
first Chinese company to list abroad), with 62% of their shares owned by Sinopec; the assets of 
the listed companies accounted for approximately one-fifth of Sinopec’s total assets. 
83. A key limitation to the development of individual companies was the upstream/downstream 
divide which made the sale and purchase of crude oil a matter of administrative control by the 
holding companies and the state. At the same time, profit retention by individual enterprises meant 
the accumulation of funds with few venues for productive use within the oil industry. Daqing, for 
example, then chose to diversify. Up to 80,000 people were employed in Daqing’s subsidiary 
companies ranging from property investment to food processing, plastics, garments, textiles, 
aerospace, and auto components. Total income from diversified business may even have come 
to rival that from the Daqing oilfield. 
84. Listing of companies typically meant restructuring. For example, in the case of Daqing, the 
listed core company ended up with approximately 106,000 employees, while 180,000 employees 
were moved into various “service companies.” Similarly, when the Shanghai Petrochemical 
Company prepared for listing in 1993, it separated its core business from its various non-core 
business activities, thereby reducing employment from approximately 60,000 to 37,000.  
85. Listing does not mean independence. Even after the Shanghai Petrochemical Company listed 
on the Hong Kong stock market in 1997, Sinopec still decided the source, amount, and price of 
crude oil supplies to the Shanghai Petrochemical Company, and decided on its wage bill. It also 
collected 55% of the distributed profits based on the Sinopec ownership share, and possibly a 
share of retained profits. 
86. By the mid-1990s, the attempts by individual companies to expand their business and to 
break the upstream/downstream divide began to endanger the status of their holding companies 
(CNPC and Sinopec). This triggered a second wave of reform.  
87. In June 1998, senior policymakers ascertained the primacy of the CNPC and Sinopec and 
decided that the CNPC and Sinopec were to be restructured along geographic lines and to each 
become vertically integrated. They were to be given complete operational independence with the 
pursuit of profits as their sole aim. All three NOCs were to pursue a listing on international stock 
markets. They were also encouraged to compete with each other.  
88.  Sinopec subsequently transferred 19 petrochemical enterprises to the CNPC, while the 
CNPC transferred 12 enterprises to Sinopec. All provincial state-owned petroleum companies and 
their petrol stations were placed under the CNPC and Sinopec. The new Sinopec accounted for 
approximately 60% of the PRC’s total refining capacity and the new CNPC for much of the 
remaining 40%; and Sinopec accounted for 30% of onshore crude production capacity (and more 
than half of the PRC’s output of main petrochemical products) and the CNPC for more than 60%.40 
Together, these two companies accounted for 90% of crude oil production, 75% of natural gas 
output, 95% of oil refining capacity, and 90% of ethylene cracking capacity. The outcome was an 
                                                 
40 In 1997, the CNPC—as the upstream company—produced 89% of the PRC’s total oil output. 
 
 
   27 
 
oligopolistic market structure for crude oil products and petrochemicals, with limited and 
administratively managed competition.  
89. In a third wave of reform, in April 2000 PetroChina Limited was floated on the New York and 
Hong Kong stock exchanges as the listed arm of the CNPC. In October 2000, Sinopec Limited 
was listed on the New York, London, and Hong Kong Stock exchanges. In February 2001, 
CNOOC Limited, incorporated in Hong Kong (not like PetroChina and Sinopec in the PRC), was 
listed on the New York and Hong Kong stock exchanges. 
90. In all three cases, what was listed was the core business, while a group (or: parent) company 
retained all non-core assets. The core business included all production assets in oil and 
petrochemicals. The non-core business included some specialist oilfield engineering services and 
otherwise non-oil and non-petrochemical businesses such as utilities and social welfare 
operations—but also “historical burdens” such as non-performing financial claims and redundant 
personnel—as well as controversial projects such as the CNPC’s holdings in Sudan. In the case 
of PetroChina, the listed company had 480,000 employees while the parent company retained 
more than a million employees. In the case of Sinopec, the listed company had 400,000 
employees compared with 1.12mio in the old Sinopec. Each listed company sold approximately 
10% of their equity. The flotations raised USD 3.0bn for the CNPC and USD 3.5bn for Sinopec, 
in contrast to an originally expected range of USD 5-10bn for each. 
91. An issue in the preparation for flotation was whether the group company (jituan gongsi)—
equally: mother company (mu gongsi)—or the ‘child’ company (erzi gongsi) was to be the entity 
for flotation. This was resolved in favor of the ‘child’ company. Nevertheless, the ‘mother’ company, 
such as the CNPC Group Company, is the controlling company (konggu gongsi) of the floated 
(child) joint stock company. The mother company is not simply a ‘shell,’ and the operational 
autonomy of the floated company is not unlimited.  
92. In 2003, all three NOCs were placed under the newly created SASAC. The outcome is a 
multi-tier structure “State Council – SASAC – individual group companies (CNPC, Sinopec, 
CNOOC) – listed companies (PetroChina, Sinopec Limited, CNOOC Limited) – their subsidiaries 
(some of which may be independently listed).” 
B. Idiosyncrasies 
93. To the outside observer, the PRC’s listed oil companies may not differ much from their 
Western competitors: They are formal companies with formal organizational structures, listed on 
international stock markets. Yet behind this appearance lurk numerous idiosyncrasies.  
Pricing 
94. Until the mid-1990s, prices of oil products were state-controlled. Upstream oil prices were 
liberalized first to closely follow global prices, benefiting the CNPC whenever international oil 
prices rose. Downstream oil prices remained tightly controlled for longer, and in years when 
international crude oil prices were low oil-refining became a loss-making business for Sinopec 
and smuggling boomed. Government subsidies were administered on a discretionary basis, 
resulting in the CNPC and Sinopec’s profits being the residual of government decisions. 
95. Historically, an array of price-setting mechanisms was in place, ranging from “State Low 
Price” to “State High Price,” free market prices, and import quotas with international market prices. 
The “State Low Price” ended in 1993-94 and crude oil prices were moved closer to international 
prices. After June 1998, domestic crude oil prices were closely linked to international prices; and 
prices were set once per month in line with changes in the international price. Domestic wholesale 
prices at the provincial level and below, as well as retail prices, however, remained controlled by 
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the state and administered by the CNPC and Sinopec.  
96. Today, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) still adjusts the domestic 
oil price—now every ten days—in accordance with changes in world market prices, and reserves 
the right to temporarily impose specific price controls for oil products. An elaborate system of 
subsidies remains in place, extending, for example, all the way to agricultural users, and the three 
NOCs are asked to smooth price fluctuations internally. 
97.  When that is not possible, the state provides ad hoc subsidies. For example, in 2008 
PetroChina faced losses on the order of USD 18bn in its refining business because it could not 
pass on the rise in international oil prices to consumers; some of these losses were balanced by 
profits in its (strong) upstream business. Sinopec was in a weaker position to offset losses and 
received USD 7.6bn in subsidies. Eventually, both PetroChina and Sinopec were paid monthly 
subsidies for losses in their refining businesses. 
98. As a result of price controls and ad hoc subsidies, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent 
NOC profits are the outcome of good management and efficient production, or of government 
price controls and ad hoc decisions. The availability of subsidies also opens the door to rent 
seeking. 
Appointments and appointment authority 
99. The boundary between state and enterprises is fluid. When the Ministry of Petroleum Industry 
was abolished in 1988, Minister Wang Tao was placed in charge of the CNPC. Bureaucrats and 
important Party members moved from government and Party institutions into the top echelons of 
the NOCs. 
100. In 2003, Fu Chengyu became the chairman and chief executive officer (CEO) of CNOOC 
Limited as well as president of the CNOOC group while holding the position of Party Secretary 
(likely in both, CNOOC Limited and the CNOOC group). In other words, the Party Secretary is 
both the manager and the chairman of the board, and he controls both the group company as 
well as the listed company.41 The non-transparent group company’s interests may well determine 
the listed company’s interests; minority shareholders have no influence. 
101. In 2011, Su Shulin moved from his position as chairman of Sinopec to the governor position 
of Fujian province. He was replaced at Sinopec by Fu Chengyu (previously at the CNOOC). Wang 
Yilin, vice-president at the CNPC, then filled Fu’s seat at the CNOOC.42 There is yet a further 
dimension to the job swaps in that Fu, when appointed head of Sinopec, remained chairman of 
CNOOC Limited, while Wang was still director of PetroChina after he became chairman of the 
CNOOC Group. Only later, when the potential conflicts of interest became public, did they resign 
from their (previous) positions in the listed companies. 
102. Given that the NOCs have ministerial rank (vice-ministerial in the case of the CNOOC) and 
given that they are in majority state ownership, the Party secretary (and thereby CEO and chair 
of the board of directors) is likely appointed by the Politburo itself, following vetting and selection 
by the Chinese Communist Party’s Organization Department. 
Relationship to government/Party 
103. It is not only in the matter of appointment mechanisms that the government/Party reaches 
deep into the NOCs. As a majority and controlling shareholder in all three listed companies, the 
                                                 
41 Sinopec’s independent non-executive directors have all worked for the government and are Party members. 
42 Job swaps are a common practice. The telecommunications industry went through systematic job rotations. 
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state/Party controls the operations of the NOCs. Thus, the NOCs serve state/Party interests such 
as provision of a reliable energy supply at stable prices. The state/Party’s interest in stable prices 
takes precedence over the NOCs’ market-based maximization of profit maximization. In the above 
reported 2008 pricing instance, Jiang Jiemin, chairman of PetroChina, explicitly stated that 
PetroChina bore the burden of refining losses due to social responsibilities.  
104.  National energy security and social policy dictated the construction of the West-East 
Pipeline—delivering natural gas from Xinijiang province to Shanghai—by PetroChina in 2002-
2004, despite the company’s opposition to the project. Foreign firms withdrew from the project 
because government-imposed price caps on gas delivered to industrial users threatened to 
undermine the project’s economic feasibility. PetroChina can expect to be compensated by the 
government for losses on the project. 
105. When U.S. President Trump visited Beijing in November 2017, the PRC leadership offered 
that Sinopec would invest USD 43bn in a project for natural gas extraction in Alaska that would 
create jobs for 12,000 U.S. Americans. For U.S. oil companies such as Exxon Mobil the project, 
which involved construction of a 1,300 kilometer gas pipeline, was too expensive, and the 
construction time (10 years), during which there would be no income flows, too long. This means 
that some activities of Sinope may be determined by the PRC leadership on non-economic 
grounds.  
106. As the PRC’s biggest global corporations, the NOCs benefit from a variety of government 
industrial policies. Such policies include, but are not limited to, government support for 
establishing international joint ventures, possibly preferential loans from state banks, and the 
privileged access to international stock markets.43  
107. While listed companies tend to be under obligation to release certain information, very little 
is known about the holding companies. The Party/state’s oversight of the holding companies via 
SASAC means the virtually total absence of transparency. Information on the holding companies 
is treated as highly sensitive. By implication, the performance of the listed companies then does 
not simply depend on economic factors but on decisions by the non-transparent holding 
companies, on government-imposed price controls (with ad hoc compensation), and state/Party-
imposed investment projects. 
Waste and corruption 
108.  In the case of Sinopec, its CNY 12mio chandelier in the entrance hall of Sinopec’s 
headquarters in Beijing gained some fame, as did the expense reports of Sinopec managers with 
millions of US dollars spent on French wines.44 In 2009, Chen Tonghai, chairman of Sinopec, 
received the death penalty (suspended for two years) for taking CNY 198mio in bribes. He 
reportedly admitted to tampering Sinopec’s accounts, embezzling tax revenues, using public 
funds to bribe other officials, and accepting expensive gifts. News of his arrest at Beijing’s airport 
in May 2007 as he tried to flee the country led to an 8% drop in Sinopec Limited’s share price. In 
2017, Wang Tianpu, president of Sinopec Group, was jailed for 15.5 years for accepting bribes of 
approximately CNY 33.5mio and embezzling state property.  
109. CNPC Chairman Jiang Jiemin in March 2013 was transferred to become head of SASAC; 
in December 2013 he was arrested on corruption charges. In 2015, Liao Yongyuan, the CNPC’s 
president, was placed under investigation, and in 2017 he was sentenced to a prison term of 15 
                                                 
43 Numerous individual cases, not further explored here, also suggest that Party / government backing allows the 
NOCs to avoid or rewrite environmental protection standards.  
44 This passage draws on Ankenbrand (2018), double-checked against and supplemented by numerous internet 
sources. 
 
 
   30 
 
years.  
110. The press labels the PRC’s senior oil industry executives the “petroleum faction.” Members 
of this faction came under the investigation of the Party’s Central Commission for Discipline 
Inspection, with many of those investigated linked to the disgraced former security chief and 
Politburo Standing Committee member Zhou Yongkang. 
Profitability and profit surrendering 
111. By 2017, Sinopec and PetroChina (the listed subsidiary of the CNPC) had become the 
world’s two largest oil companies by revenue (Table 5), out-ranking even those international oil 
companies that had previously far exceeded Sinopec and PetroChina in size. By the 2010s, the 
CNPC’s research and development (R&D) expenditures even exceeded those of Shell, which 
previously had the largest R&D expenditures among all oil companies. 
112. The performance of Sinopec and PetroChina (China National Petroleum) lags far behind 
that of their competitors. Sinopec’s return on assets (ROA) in 2017 was 0.4% and that of 
PetroChina -0.1%. The ROA of the next three international competitors was between three and 
fourteen times higher than that of Sinopec. As regards assets per employee, the ratios of the 
competitors were between seven and ten times higher, suggesting severe over-employment in 
Sinopec and PetroChina. If Sinopec and PetroChina as listed companies already suffer from 
severe over-employment, then the fact that their parent companies in charge of non-core business 
have another two or three times as many employees than the listed companies suggests 
potentially highly inefficient operations. 
113. It may well be the case that the performance contracts that SOE managers sign with SASAC 
and which specify compensation relative to, typically, profit objectives achieved, create incentives 
for SOE managers to pursue profit maximization. But the profitability of Sinopec and PetroChina 
suggests either that these incentive contracts do not work well (maybe they are trumped by other, 
career-oriented objectives within the Party) or are defeated by the lack of independence of the 
NOCs. Thus, the ROA may be low because the NOCs are constrained in the economic activities 
they can undertake, and the government may choose to use the NOCs as income-earning 
endeavors and tax them correspondingly. 
 
  
Mixed ownership reform 
114. Sinopec was one of the first companies to proceed in response to the mixed ownership 
initiative. In 2014, it opened its wholly-owned subsidiary Sinopec Sales Co., Ltd., to 29.99% (CNY 
Table 5: Fortune Global 500 List 2018, Sinopec and PetroChina 
 Rank Revenues 
(USD 
mio) 
Profits 
(USD 
mio) 
Assets 
(USD 
mio) 
Employees ROA 
(%) 
Profit per 
employee 
Assets per 
employee
(mio) 
Sinopec 3 326,953 1,538 346,545 667,793 0.4 2,303 0.5 
China National Petr. 4 326,008 -691 629,411 1,470,193 -0.1 -470 0.4 
Royal Dutch Shell 5 311,870 12,977 407,097 84,000 3.2 154,488 4.8 
BP 8 244,582 3,389 276,515 74,000 1.2 45,797 3.7 
Exxon Mobil 9 244,363 19,710 348,691 71,200 5.7 276,826 4.9 
ROA = return on assets. 
Note: Data presumably are for 2017. 
Source: http://fortune.com/global500/, accessed 21 September 2018. 
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107.1bn) outside ownership via a capital increase. The 25 investors comprise numerous SOEs 
(such as insurance companies). Four private companies (including Tencent and Hai’er) hold an 
aggregate 4.58% stake. Sinopec Sales Co., Ltd. has signed cooperation agreements with ten of 
its investors, some of which suggest an expansion beyond the core business of the company. The 
company itself describes its main business as: retail, direct distribution and warehousing of 
gasoline, kerosene and diesel; natural gas operation for vehicles; retail prepackaged food, bulk 
food, dairy products; health food; retail of cigarettes and cigars (and another two dozen non-core 
business items). 
115. The CNPC also proceeded with mixed ownership reform. In April 2014, it sold 6 units 
involved in oil refining, pipeline construction, financing and other areas to private capital. In May 
2014 it announced a plan to raise private funds to develop oilfields in the Xinjiang Uyghur 
Autonomous Region.  
 
V. CURRENT CHALLENGES OF STATE OWNERSHIP  
116. This section discusses fundamental questions of state ownership in the PRC today. What 
are the objectives of state ownership? How are ownership, regulation, and restructuring being 
handled? How are SOEs being supervised?  
A. Objectives of State Ownership 
117. The objective of SOEs in the PRC has evolved over time. In the pre-reform period, state 
ownership served as the pillar of the pre-reform planned economy and polity: half of state 
revenues were derived from SOEs, and, apart from the government administration and Party, 
SOEs were the only providers of urban jobs. 
118. In the reform period (after 1978), SOEs faced increasing competition by collective-owned 
(and to a limited extent private) enterprises. At this point, the task of SOEs became codified in the 
SOE Law of 1988: to, in accordance with the state plan and market demand, develop commodity 
production, create wealth (chuangzao caifu), increase accumulation, and satisfy the daily 
increasing material and cultural needs of society.  
119. The Company Law (NPC, 29 December 1993, Art. 5), applicable to SOEs organized in the 
form of companies, declares the objectives of companies to be to increase their “economic results” 
(jingji xiaoyi) and labor productivity, and to maintain and increase their asset values. “Economic 
results” remains undefined (financial performance, or even just profitability?). 
120. The regulation on the organization of SASAC (State Council, 10 October 2008) in specifying 
the tasks of SASAC lists one SOE objective: to maintain and increase the value of state assets.45 
The focus on asset value is a permanent feature of the PRC economy reaching back to the 1950s 
when fixed asset measures and working capital values were cornerstones of the planned 
economy. The continued focus on asset values today still reflects a fixation on quantity of capital, 
in particular physical capital.  
121. In none of the available documents does profitability appear as an explicit objective for the 
SOEs in the PRC. SOEs thus would seem to play by different rules than other market participants 
                                                 
45 An article in The Economist (Schumpeter, 2018) following an interview with SASAC personnel, states: “While 
SASAC is not explicit about it, it has three, conflicting, objectives: to boost profits and cut debts; to persuade foreigners 
that SOEs have more autonomy, and to cement the party’s muscular role.” And “according to SASAC, the Party wants 
to guide the conduct of SOE bosses but not micromanage. SASAC itself does not want to be responsible for firm’s 
results, but wants to set the boundaries of strategy.” 
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in the PRC. However, profitability may well have been the unspoken underlying SOE objective for 
most of the reform period. The SOE reform measures of 1998-2000 were undertaken precisely 
because SOEs were incurring losses that were deemed too high. Bankruptcies of SASAC 
enterprises are pursued precisely because these enterprises are not, or cannot become profitable. 
Restructuring of SOEs under SASAC occurs precisely to turn them into viable (i.e., profitable) 
enterprises. Zombie enterprises are labeled such precisely because they have experienced three 
continuous years of losses. And it is profitability and thereby corporate income taxes that is of 
interest to revenue-starved governments, especially at below-central tiers; SASAC and provincial 
ASACs also have a direct interest in profitability in that the dividend payments they receive depend 
on profit. 
122. Despite its stated focus on asset values, SASAC in its three-year performance contracts 
with its subordinate SOEs emphasizes profitability. A contract contains annual and three-year 
targets, and among the annual targets profit plays a dominant role. Managers are evaluated 
according to the profitability of their company.46   
123. Profitability and maximization of asset values are related. To the extent that asset values 
increase if a firm is profitable and reinvests retained profits, asset values may yet reflect 
profitability. But that link is tenuous; asset values could equally well be increased by incurring 
greater debts. The focus on asset values may also be plausible if SOEs were to be privatized 
eventually, in the sense that a higher value of assets, given the amount of debt, may fetch a higher 
price. 
124. If profitability were the de facto sole objective of SOEs, i.e., if SOEs differ little from private 
enterprises, one may question why the need for SOEs? Given the continued importance of SOEs 
to the PRC leadership, one may conclude that there are other reasons for the continued existence 
of SOEs. Thus, one might for example hypothesize that SOEs play an important role in promoting 
economy-wide economic growth. But a study by Holz (2011) shows that promoting economic 
growth via linkage effects is not an SOE objective: SOEs are not strategically located in high-
linkage sectors that facilitate economy-wide growth. Instead, the prevalence of SOEs across 
economic sectors appears to be driven mostly by profitability. 
125. Numerous SOE objectives do not appear in official documents but are difficult to deny.47 
These include the following: 
 Creating employment and maintaining employment (an issue of “social stability”), including, 
especially, for Party members.48 
 Serving ad hoc government / Party needs, which includes providing a rapid response 
mechanism in a case such as the U.S. Financial Crisis in 2008. 
 Creating job and income opportunities for the highest echelons of government and Party 
cadres, with leadership positions in SOEs as pre-retirement positions for former 
                                                 
46 Naughton (2010) reports that profit in relation to an agreed target is valued at up to 30 points (out of 100), the 
rate of return on equity at up to 40 points, and sector-specific targets at a further up to 30 points. 
47 The State Council in its 10 October 2008 stipulation on the organization of SASAC contains a catch-all item of 
implementing “social responsibility” in its enterprises. Hong and Nong (2013) list (and critically analyze) six “missions” 
of SOEs: enriching the country and strengthening the military, guaranteeing people’s livelihoods, national security, 
international competitiveness, social responsibility, and foundation of the ruling Party. 
48 Ankenbrand (2018) suspects that one-quarter of the 40mio employees of SOEs are Party members. This 
compares with 7% Party membership across the population. (The cited employment figure of 40mio refers to 
enterprises, i.e., excludes employment in various state and state-affiliated organs that are not registered as 
enterprises.) 
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government and Party cadres, or assigned to their family members.49 
 Serving the most varied political objectives, such as being ordered to stop production in 
August 2016 for the G20 meeting in Hangzhou to enjoy a blue sky. 
 Meeting national security needs (including “securing” material resources, and acquiring 
technology abroad). 
 Helping finance economic development in underdeveloped regions of the PRC, and  
supporting the PRC’s security apparatus in “minority”-dominated areasC.50 
 Serving as “national champions.”  
 Implementing Xi Jinping’s “China Dream,” which includes such measures as the “Belt and 
Road” Initiative, where SOEs may be used to conduct unprofitable economic activities in 
neighboring countries in pursuit of the Dream,51 or they may be prime beneficiaries of 
profit opportunities created by the Dream.52 
There also remains an ideological element for having SOEs. State ownership of means of 
production is one of the four defining elements of socialism (besides “dictatorship of the 
proletariat,” central planning, and “remuneration according to effort”). Abandoning state ownership 
may be too close for comfort when such ideological elements serve to legitimize Party rule. 
126. The multitude of objectives makes it impossible to evaluate SOE performance: Along which 
criterion, or which combination of criteria, are SOEs to be evaluated? SASAC may well wish to 
work with a profitability criterion in evaluating the management of central SOEs, but how can it 
then take into account the various other objectives that SOEs may be asked to fulfill at varying 
times? In the example of the NOCs, any profitability objective is trumped by government pricing 
policies, including ad hoc adjustments to prices. The absence of a formal objective—or the 
presentation of a formal objective (maintain and increase state assets) that is of questionable 
relevance in practice—means that all evaluation of enterprise performance in the end can only be 
discretionary and subjective, no matter how detailed and specific SASAC’s management 
contracts may appear. 
B. Ownership, Regulation, Restructuring, and Supervision 
127. The introductory section to the State Council’s 2008 stipulation on the organization of 
                                                 
49 Leutert (2018b) documents for 864 leader-year observations (2003-2012) that a top executive posting in an 
SOE tended to be a “one-way exit” into retirement, rather than one step in a revolving door process. Of those who did 
not leave executive positions in SOEs for retirement, virtually all moved laterally, such as to another (core central) SOE. 
Mitchell (2018b) quotes David Webb, a Hong Kong-based corporate governance activist, as saying “I don’t own SOEs 
because in general, they are run more for-party than for-profit.” 
50 See, for example, Feng (2018) in a Financial Times article on the mass incarceration of Uighurs in the PRC’s 
Xinjiang province, which mentions “financial sponsorship from China’s state tobacco enterprise” for building new “ethnic 
unity villages” in the desert (apparently, largely unsuccessful ventures). SOEs are also standard counterparties in the 
PRC’s duikou system, where government and Party organizations as well as SOEs in the richer regions of the PRC 
are asked to financially, materially, and through the delegation of personnel contribute (as donations) to the economic 
development in the backward regions. 
51  See, for example, the case study of the oil industry above, for an SOE being relegated to undertaking 
unprofitable activities. 
52 For example, Kynge (2018) reports that the Export-Import Bank of China and the China Development Bank, 
which lend more internationally than the West’s six multilateral development banks combined, do not conduct open, 
competitive tenders for contractors. “This has almost always meant that lucrative contracts were awarded to members 
of a charmed circle of Chinese state-owned enterprises little incentivized to take local concerns on board.” 
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SASAC (SC, 10 October 2008) characterizes SASAC as a specially established institution directly 
under the State Council (guowuyuan zhishu teshe jigou); its Party cell fulfills the tasks assigned 
by the CCPCC. Under the heading “adjustment of responsibility,” SASAC is placed in charge of 
SOE reform and restructuring, of adjusting the geographic and sectoral distribution of SOEs, and 
of further advancing state capital in those sectors and areas that are related to national security 
or that are a “lifeline of the national economy.” SASAC is also to strengthen financial supervision, 
risk control and the auditing of economic responsibility, as well as to improve the appraisal system 
of management and to promote social responsibility. 
128. SASAC’s first task is to, in accordance with the Company Law and other relevant laws and 
administrative regulations, fulfill the responsibility of an investor, to supervise the central state-
owned non-financial enterprises, and to strengthen the management of state assets. 
Subsequently listed SASAC tasks include to: 
 maintain and increase the value of state assets;  
 implement SOE reform and restructuring while transforming enterprises into modern 
companies; 
 appoint and dismiss the responsible personnel; 
 dispatch supervisory boards; 
 organize the submission of proceeds from the use of the state’s capital (the state capital 
management budget, discussed above); 
 implement national safety regulations; 
 take responsibility for the basic administration of state assets, draft laws and stipulations 
regarding the administration of state assets, issue relevant regulations, and guide and 
supervise the work of local state asset administrations; 
 and fulfill other tasks as assigned by the State Council. 
129. These tasks can be grouped under four headings: ownership, regulation, restructuring, and 
supervision. Two contradictions immediately stand out: First, there is a conflict between being an 
owner who would, for example, wish to maximize the return on equity, and being a regulator who 
might be concerned about risks to the national economy potentially triggered by maximization of 
returns on equity. Second, there is also a potential conflict between the pursuit of professional 
management of state assets and any political prerogatives that may be imposed by the 
government / Party (including through political personnel appointments to SOEs). Such conflicts 
are not addressed by the State Council stipulation of 2008 and remain unresolved.  
Ownership and regulation 
130. While SASAC supposedly exercises the powers of an owner over its subordinate enterprises, 
these powers are de facto highly constricted. First, SASAC does not have the power to decide on 
the use of SOE profits. It has taken more than a decade for SASAC to extract a modest share of 
SOE profits via the state capital budget management system. The current level of extraction may 
well go towards restructuring costs of loss-making SOEs, or to support SOEs that were otherwise 
not viable.  
131. Second, ownership is a fleeting right that may be taken away or altered. Thus, the State 
Council on 9 November 2017 decreed that 10% of the ownership of large and medium-sized 
SOEs (at central and local level) as well as of financial institutions is to be transferred to the Social 
Security Fund (in the case of central enterprises and financial institutions) and to newly to be 
established provincial solely state-invested companies with the purpose of funding social security 
tasks. The program was to start in 2017 with 3-5 central SOEs and 2 (central) financial institutions, 
and then to be implemented step by step in 2018. SASAC is in charge of finalizing a program for 
the transfer of ownership. 
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132.  Third, SASAC has little authority vis-à-vis SOE managers. Thus, SASAC has no 
appointment authority over 53 of its SOEs, where top-level appointments are reviewed and 
approved by the Politburo following vetting by the Party Organization Department.53 All key 
appointments are handled through Party channels, starting with the Party committee within the 
SOE and continuing with the external (local/provincial/central) Party Organization Department 
and ultimately a decision by the (external) Party Committee. 54  At the center, the top-level 
appointees likely enjoy an equal if not higher bureaucratic rank than even the head of SASAC, 
and thus are unlikely to submit to directives from SASAC. Top-level positions in central SOEs are 
at the core of the Party’s personnel patronage system and bypass any SASAC “ownership” 
function. 
133. Fourth, SASAC conglomerates are highly opaque organizations with little accountability. 
SASAC staff, if given access, may not even be qualified to evaluate these firms’ operations. 
SASAC staff were originally derived from government departments that were abolished in earlier 
administrative reforms and from Party organs; these cadres may have little insight into efficient 
management of large conglomerates. 
134. Fifth, while SASAC SOEs are organized as companies, their internal institutions do not 
necessarily fulfill the functions associated with them in the West. Thus, attempting to fulfill 
ownership functions via a board of directors that is run by a Party Secretary appointed by the 
Politburo may be futile. To the extent that the Party committee/cell within a state company overlaps 
with the board of directors, SASAC may not have had a say in any of the appointments to the 
board of directors.  
135. For all the same reasons, the regulatory authority of SASAC is weak. As a special institution 
under the State Council, it lacks the authority previously accorded to line ministries that were in 
charge of SOEs in a particular sector of the economy. In all three SOE reform policies discussed 
above that SASAC was involved in—the transformation of non-tradable into tradable shares, the 
organization of management buyouts, and the establishment of the state capital management 
budget system—SASAC participated but was not the final authority.  
Restructuring and sector focus 
136. A key task of SASAC is the restructuring of its subordinate enterprises. SOE reform issues 
did not disappear with the creation of SASAC. Rather, they disappeared from public view by 
becoming in-house issues of SASAC. To the extent that there are loss-making enterprises, or to 
the extent that SOEs are to be dissolved or merged, these matters now happen behind SASAC’s 
closed doors. 
137. Which SOEs are to be retained and which sectors SOEs are to withdraw from have always 
been a matter of discussion. The 10th Five-Year Plan (2001-2005) delineated the future scope of 
state ownership in industry (SETC, October 2001). The plan distinguished between five groups 
of industry sectors: 
(i) Military industry remains overwhelmingly state controlled.  
(ii) In public goods industries and services as well as in natural monopolies, the state should 
                                                 
53 “53” is a widely cited number, which, however, may have changed in the course of enterprise restructuring under 
SASAC. For example, Leutert (2018a) mentions 53 central “core” firms (or: “important backbone state-owned 
enterprises”) at the start of Xi Jinping first term as Party Secretary in 2012, each at vice-ministerial rank. (Contrary to 
this source, at least the CNPC and Sinopec are at ministerial rank.) 
54 McNally (2002) provides a detailed description of the selection and appointment process in Shanghai at the 
time. 
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hold a controlling stake.  
(iii) In industries of great economic importance for the “strength of the nation,” such as the 
petroleum, automobile, telecommunications, machine building, and high technology 
industries, state backbone enterprises should continue to hold a dominant position.  
(iv) In key high technology areas, the state should adopt a driving function; it need not control 
production, but provide financing and support basic and applied research.  
(v) In “ordinary,” competitive sectors, the existing SOEs should focus on improving efficiency, 
with large enterprises adopting the company system and small and medium-sized enterprises 
undertaking various property rights reforms; domestic enterprises not owned by the state, as 
well as foreign enterprises, are invited to participate in the SOE restructuring. 
138.  Li Rongrong, then head of SASAC, in the mid-2000s summarized the priorities more 
succinctly as: national security, natural monopolies, public goods or services, important national 
resources, and key enterprises in “pillar” industries and in high-tech sectors. Each SOE should 
rank number 1, 2 or 3 in its respective markets or exit. The intention was to build strong, 
competitive firms around core businesses. As investor, SASAC would also not sell down its shares 
in listed SOEs because the PRC would still need state-owned companies in a “guiding” (zhudao) 
position, even as the market economy developed.55  
139. Li Rongrong (2006) elaborated further: In seven defense and “lifeline” industries, the state 
is to maintain absolute control; these are military industry, power grid, petroleum and 
petrochemical products, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and shipping. 56  Important 
“backbone” enterprises should continue to exercise relatively strong control over nine basic 
industries and pillar industries: equipment, automobiles, information technology, construction, 
steel, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, geological prospecting, and science.57 By 2010, the above 
industries must have a number of important backbone enterprises that have a strong influence on 
the sector’s development; the important backbone enterprises in petroleum and petrochemicals, 
telecommunications, electric power, metallurgy, shipping, and construction are to become world-
class enterprises, those in automobiles, equipment, and electronics are to lay the foundations for 
becoming world-class enterprises.58  
140. In a press conference on 19 December 2013, Huang Shuhe, deputy-head of SASAC, stated 
the following “considerations,” distinguishing by degree of state control:  
(i) A few (presumably traditional) SOEs and state-owned companies relevant for national 
security can be in sole state ownership. 
(ii) SOEs relevant to the “national economic lifeline” (guomin jingji mingmai) and SOEs in 
important sectors and key areas can remain in absolute state control. 
                                                 
55 See Naughton (2005 and 2008). 
56 In the case of basic infrastructure in the first four industries, the state should have an absolutely controlling 
stake; in the case of subsidiaries in these four sectors as well as in the case of central enterprises in civil aviation and 
shipping, the state should also have an absolutely controlling stake; in the case of central enterprises in downstream 
petroleum products and in value-added services in telecommunications, more reform and restructuring should be 
undertaken and non-state funding should be sought. 
57 Central enterprises are to be important backbone enterprises and sectoral leaders in equipment, automobiles, 
information technology, construction, steel, and non-ferrous metals. State-owned capital is to hold either absolute 
control or under certain conditions relative control. 
58 As of late 2018, these are indeed sectors where state ownership is dominant or strong, but it is also strong in 
other sectors, from what one would expect to be competitive sectors to typical public goods sectors such as education, 
health, and public management (Table 1). 
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(iii) Important SOEs in pillar industries and high tech industries, etc., can remain in relative 
state control. 
(iv) When state capital does not need to be in a controlling position, SOEs can be controlled 
by social capital, or the state may hold shares in the company, or the state can completely 
withdraw. 
141. The discussion of which sectors SOEs are to focus on is ongoing. It keeps moving around 
the same themes, from national security to lifeline industries, pillar industries, and high tech 
industries, but fails to clearly identify which SOEs fall into which category (that is then to be treated 
in a particular way). The 2015 Guiding Opinions asked for classification of SOEs according to 
their functions (which would then allow differentiated policies). At the national level that 
classification is still not completed. (Some provincial ASACs, such as that of Shanghai, have 
proceeded to classify their SOEs.) This is not only a matter of top-level decision making, but also 
a highly contested topic among enterprises. Managers of individual SOEs are naturally reluctant 
to see the relevance of their enterprise reduced.59 
Supervision 
142. The issue of SOE supervision has a long history. Precisely because so much economic 
power is vested in SOEs and because Party structures supplant formal checks and balances, the 
use and misuse of state assets have been a recurrent theme throughout the reform period. The 
issue of supervision is aggravated by the ambiguity in SOE objectives. Absent a singular objective 
(or clearly delineated set of objectives), mechanisms to identify poor management are lacking. 
No matter how elaborate the evaluation system for managers may be, if ad hoc instructions force 
managers’ hands any set of evaluation criteria is invalidated.  
143. The formal supervisory institution for SOEs is SASAC and the corresponding provincial 
ASACs. SASAC has three departments in charge of supervision and lists the personnel of 29 
supervisory boards for key large SOEs on its website.60 But the effectiveness of the supervisory 
board of formal state-owned companies (which, as of 2018, nearly all SOEs are) is in question 
when the chair of the supervisory board is a member of the Party committee together with those 
(managers, directors) that the supervisory board is supposed to supervise. The supervisory board 
is in no position to supervise the Party secretary, who may well be the chair of the Board of 
Directors and/or the CEO. 
144. Consequently, the SASAC Party committee is equally being assigned a supervisory function 
(for example, in the 2015 Guiding Opinions), as is the cell of the CCPCC Commission for 
Discipline Inspection that is attached to the SASAC Party committee. But these personnel are 
unlikely to be financial or management specialists. They are unlikely to be able to assess 
corporate strategy, risks and risk management, the viability of control systems, the financial 
reporting process, or compliance with legislation and regulations. Given how they obtained their 
position (as trusted Party members through Party channels), they are unlikely to have the interests 
of shareholders at heart. Supervision can only occur in the broadest sense. It will likely focus on 
“corruption,” with as only tool of supervision the removal of specific, “corrupt” individuals through 
the CCPCC Commission for Discipline Inspection and no changes to how the company operates. 
                                                 
59 The International Monetary Fund in a fiscal policy paper in 2016 offered a distinction along two criteria: 
commercial viability (low vs. high) and policy or strategic relevance (low vs. high), with corresponding recommendations 
for reform. But the formulation of clear categories and preferences in the PRC appears subject to so many conflicting 
interests (of SOEs, different bureaucracies, and Party factions) with such a variety of types of relevance (“lifeline” 
economy, “pillar” industries, and “backbone” enterprises) that a decision on classification and corresponding 
consequences has been out of reach. 
60 See http://www.sasac.gov.cn/n2588020/n2877933/index.html, accessed 1 June 2018. 
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Given that the formal institutions of companies are supplanted by Party structures, supervision 
can ultimately only come through the Party personnel administration, and it is limited to personnel 
control. 
145. In a stock market based system, shareholders would ultimately exercise supervision. In the 
PRC, with the state holding majority or controlling shares across “state-owned” enterprises, the 
market cannot supervise. Supposedly SASAC-appointed supervisory boards of companies play 
little role in the face of the dominating role of the Party cell. In a control-based system, banks or 
founders would exercise supervision, but banks in the PRC are also state-owned, and without 
authority to play an active role in SOE supervision.61 Consequently, SOEs have an extraordinary 
degree of independence, while at the same time being linked into a Party personnel system that 
deals in people rather than evaluating and supervising economic decisions.  
C. Corporate Governance: Evaluation  
146.  The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has issued 
guidelines on the governance of state-owned enterprises (first version of 2005, revised in 2015).62 
The guidelines have three aims (2015 edition, p. 11): (i) to professionalize the state as an owner; 
(ii) to make SOEs operate with similar efficiency, transparency and accountability as good practice 
private enterprises; and (iii) to ensure that competition between SOEs and private enterprises, 
where such occurs, is conducted on a level playing field. PRC policy statements regarding SOE 
reform suggest that at least the first of these three aims—professionalization of ownership—
equally applies to the PRC. The second aim applies partially: SOE efficiency levels comparable 
to private enterprises is inherent in the desire for competitive SOEs; transparency and 
accountability, however, are not PRC aims.63 The third aim, a level playing field between SOEs 
and the private sector is not an explicit PRC policy and given the multitude of regulations and 
restrictions, it is hard to pass judgment as to what degree a level playing field exists, sector by 
sector of the economy.  
147. The OECD guidelines comprise approximately 40 items of good governance across several 
themes. Contrasting the OECD’s guidelines on corporate governance of SOEs with PRC practice 
reveals large gaps: A clear rationale for state ownership of the multitude and diversity of SOEs is 
lacking, boards of directors do not independently exercise their responsibilities, the ownership 
entity cannot be held accountable, the state is not an informed and active owner, ownership and 
other state functions are not separate, some if not most SOEs do not face market consistent 
conditions regarding access to debt and equity finance, and financial and non-financial 
transparency is sorely lacking except for listed companies (though information on parent 
companies, if that exists, is again lacking). 
148. At the center of the governance gap appears to be the absence of clearly identified SOE 
objectives. Without clearly identified objectives, supervision—no matter how it is organized—
lacks an unambiguous criterion for evaluation and can only investigate for “corruption” rather than 
examine activities that fail to further the stated objectives of an SOE. Supervision then is not 
supervision of management performance but supervision of criminal activities. The institutional 
                                                 
61 See Naughton (2008) for the distinction between market-based vs. control-based systems. 
62 The OECD guidelines cover all enterprises that are under the control of the state, “either by the state being the 
ultimate beneficiary owner of the majority of voting shares or otherwise exercising an equivalent degree of control” 
(OECD, 2015, p. 14). The PRC terminology “state-owned and state-controlled enterprises” (SOSCEs) covers the same 
ground. 
63 In fact, the opposite appears to hold: The intentional obscuring and withholding of SOE-related information. 
(See, for example, Mitchell, 2018b.)  
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framework in the PRC is aligned: The personnel appointment mechanism ensures the priority of 
the Party and its policies at all times,64 and supervision is exercised by the Party’s Commission 
for Discipline Inspection, targeting corruption. 
149. Introduction of the Western company system in the PRC has had little or no effect on 
corporate governance. Corporate institutions ranging from independent members of the board of 
directors to strong third-party institutions covering everything from accounting to legal services 
are either weak, undermined, or missing. What it did achieve was to allow SOEs access to stock 
markets in the PRC and abroad, i.e., to allow re-capitalization of (listed) SOEs through channels 
other than the state budget and state bank lending, and thereby to free the state of some of its 
liability for SOE failures. 
150. Perhaps the closest model for the PRC is an Asian model of family-controlled pyramid 
groups, except that in the case of the PRC, the family is the Party. The Party’s objectives are not 
solely economic, and Party management deals in people rather than in business substance.  
151. SASAC, the government institution that nominally owns and regulates SOEs, appears to be 
a smokescreen for the actual channels of authority and a convenient location where to deposit 
(and make invisible) SOE problems. The fact that the restructuring of SOEs is still ongoing, twenty 
years after the 1998-2000 SOE reform program that was to have resolved SOE problems, and 
despite a second attempt at resolving SOE problems by SASAC in the mid-2000s, suggests that 
neither the formal institutional arrangement with SASAC, nor the underlying Party structures are 
successful in tackling economic issues.   
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS  
152. SOE reform in the 1980s was characterized by a move toward separation of government 
and enterprises, and towards separation of Party and the government. Today, the opposite is the 
case. The Party openly leads the government, and the dominance of the Party committee in SOEs 
not only undermines the institutions of the company system but has come to be an important 
factor even in private and foreign-owned enterprises. This ensures high compliance with central 
Party directives. The controlling authority of the Party can promote competition and growth by, for 
example, allowing private actors into industries and by forcing SOEs to compete. But a highly 
centralized system with top-level policies also has its limitations, experienced, for example, as 
overcapacity (relevant for steel production starting in 2015) or excessive indebtedness (following 
the PRC’s response to the 2008 U.S. Financial Crisis). The PRC’s industrial policy has been 
predicted to lead to a five-fold overcapacity in robotics manufacturing in 2020. There would seem 
to be a fine distinction between the state supporting and promoting certain economic activities 
and a Party control system that incentivizes SOE leadership to follow top-level directives, even if 
in disregard of economic fundamentals, and thereby ultimately hampering economic growth. 
153. In 2002, McNally was agnostic about improvements to corporate governance. He noted (p. 
109) that “since all corporate decisions are either made by a corporation’s party committee or 
handed down through party channels, the system of internal checks and balances within a 
corporation envisaged by the Company Law has failed to take root.” He concluded that the 
institutional structures through which the Party monitors and controls SOEs have a corrosive 
                                                 
64 SASAC’s contracts with SOE management, potentially specifying profit objectives, likely pale in importance 
compared with the direct chain of command within the Party structure. McNally (2002, p. 109) finds that “managers of 
state assets thus tend to spend considerable effort presenting the right political image and nurturing good relations with 
superiors in the party hierarchy. Effectively managing state assets is secondary, especially since there are few negative 
consequences of economic mismanagement.”  
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effect on the governance of the majority of SOEs in that they lead to inadequate monitoring of 
managerial performance, weaken managerial incentives, and exacerbate the lack of transparency, 
which in turn allows state managers to create their own spheres of autonomy (leading to insider 
control and corruption). The solution is to “require the party to substantially diminish its authority 
over state sector executives” (p. 91); “the first step would be to centralize the oversight and 
management of state holding corporations, including personnel appointments, in one government 
institution” (p. 113). But that, he concluded, is politically difficult. Today the Party is far from 
relinquishing control. Rather, reforms have proceeded in the opposite direction, strengthening 
Party control without resolving the conflicts. 
154. Naughton (2010) ponders whether the cost of public ownership may not be acceptable when 
market failure (including the absence of strong regulatory capacity) is widespread. In such 
circumstances, competition may be more important than ownership. He argues that the PRC’s 
SOEs compete by design, often in markets structured as dominant-player oligopolies with a 
competitive (including private) fringe.65 Firms in near-monopoly position reap monopoly rents 
which, under state ownership, are re-invested. Private firms benefit from spill-overs such as when 
capacity (for example, in infrastructure) moves ahead of demand and creates profit opportunities 
for all.66 One could find many more arguments in favor of SOEs, from reliable tax collection in a 
system where private enterprises frequently manage to escape taxation to issues of social stability 
in a country the size of the PRC with weak institutions.  
155. Under such circumstances, reliance on the authority of the Party appears indispensable. It 
is the Party that ensures competition: When the division of the petroleum industry into one 
upstream conglomerate and one downstream conglomerate turns out to be inefficient, firms are 
rearranged to create two competing integrated conglomerates. When competition becomes too 
fierce, as it may have in the telecommunications market with the three firms competing for market 
share in a price war, the CEOs of the three firms are reshuffled (and the CEOs get the message). 
Mergers can be enforced top-down to reduce competition or to create giant firms that can improve 
efficiency and compete internationally. Where central government departments are too weak to 
enforce national policies and to regulate reliably, and where individual SOEs have built fiefdoms 
within the state, the Party personnel appointment mechanism allows for immediate corrections, 
outside any regulatory framework, without need for justification or consistency. (The underlying 
assumption, though, is that this abstract construct ‘Party,’ that is seen as in charge, is “good” and 
knows what is “best.”) 
156. Reliance on the Party is also indispensable when one realizes that the Party’s control over 
the economy is all-encompassing. By controlling the banking system and major enterprises in the 
real economy (SOEs), the Party directly controls the basic functioning of the economy with 
mechanisms of control that far exceed the effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policy (which are 
also under Party control). 
157. The relationship between SOEs and the (state-owned) banks is particularly complex and 
held together ultimately by Party control. On the one hand, bank lending to SOEs may come with 
the benefit of an implicit state guarantee for the loan. On the other hand, banks have also been 
asked to take some of the financial burden off SOEs by swapping debt into equity, rolling over 
                                                 
65 Examples along these lines are competition among the three state telecommunications firms (China Mobile, 
China Unicom, and China Telecom) and competition among the three centrally owned airlines (Air China, China 
Southern, and China Eastern). 
66 Another characteristic of the PRC’s development trajectory has been the absence of a unified vision for 
economic development. While individual departments may plan (and individual SOEs pursue their own agendas), 
overall policies develop in response to continuously evolving signals from the economy, including the performance of 
SOEs. Rules and incentives can be changed at any time, and institutions can be repurposed freely. 
 
 
   41 
 
non-performing loans, or writing off loans (typically with subsidies by the finance departments). In 
a number of instances local banks went bankrupt and were bailed out and restructured by local 
authorities when SOEs struggled to repay their loans. In other instances, SOEs are brought in to 
save bankrupt banks, for example by buying non-performing loans at face value. In yet other 
instances, SOEs or private enterprises are the main shareholders of a local bank and also the 
bank’s biggest clients.67 
158. State-ownership in the PRC in the final instance is the expression of the Party’s control over 
the economy. In such an environment, strong regulatory capacity with a strong private sector 
cannot co-exist. The Party makes and adjusts the law. I.e., the Party cannot be subjected to an 
independent regulatory framework and formal institutions that operate independently of the Party, 
and cannot submit to market outcomes created by private actors if these outcomes run counter 
to the Party’s prerogatives. From the absolute authority of the Party follows the reliance on the 
cadre management system that dominates SOE management and also reaches into private 
enterprises. 
159. But the Party, despite its Leninist-authoritarian character, is not a monolithic organization. 
Given the large number of SOEs (with enterprise numbers in excess of 100,000), individual SOEs 
can come to behave like powerful families or interest groups (some headed by minister-rank 
personnel) that block reforms and pursue enterprise-specific or person-specific interests that in 
turn shape Party policies.68 
160. The outcome is a corporate governance structure that in its management of SOEs ultimately 
relies on only one mechanism: the Party appointment system, complemented by the Party’s “anti-
corruption” campaign. SOEs (or SOSCEs) in the PRC are less “state-owned and state-controlled 
enterprises” than they are “state-owned, Party-controlled enterprises.” There is little point 
recommending adoption of OECD principles of good governance in the presence of an 
overarching Party priority that does not accord with Western corporate governance principles.  
161. Naughton (2010) argues that when the rural-urban transition is complete and when the 
economy ceases being a pure follower economy, the need to increase efficiency and creativity 
leads to a turning point. Such a turning point could lead to the establishment of competing 
sovereign wealth funds, along the lines of the state-owned asset management system since 
promoted by the 2013 Third Plenum but until today not realized. As Naughton points out (pp. 
458f.), ”the Party would have to agree that ‘one share, one vote’ really means that appointments 
to the Board of Directors, and ultimately appointments of managers, are determined by weighted 
alliances of different shareholders, and not just by the Party speaking for the dominant 
government shareholder.” But as Party directives and Party Secretary Xi Jinping’s statements of 
the recent years indicate, such a reduction in Party control is not on the horizon. 
162. The PRC then is facing the dilemma of having an increasingly sophisticated economy, with 
an increasingly complex web of economic transactions and developments that are beyond the 
                                                 
67 Funding of such banks frequently comes from sources other than deposits (such as trusts and securities 
companies), and lending frequently ends up being shadow loans to avoid regulators’ lending limits. Wildau and Jia 
(2018) detail some individual cases. To give just one example of the many possible, complex incentive mechanisms at 
work, SOEs may be willing to purchase bank loans at face value if that offers them an easy way to then take control of 
the borrower, where otherwise the SOEs may have been prohibited from expanding into the business of the borrower. 
68 For example, the administration of the previous (2002/03-2012/13) Party Secretary Hu Jintao and Prime Minister 
Wen Jiabao attempted to redistribute income from SOEs to labor, but powerful SOEs and state-owned banks were able 
to resist, at least until 2007, when the capital management budget system was introduced, initially at practically no cost 
to enterprises (due to the reduction in the corporate income tax rate). Similarly, a central plan to reduce transportation 
costs was blocked by state-owned oil companies concerned about their profits. See, for example, Davis (2012) for 
attempts at redistributive measures being blocked by SOEs. 
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planning capability of any planning authority, but with none of the institutions to support such an 
economy. An increasingly first-world economy is commandeered in what resembles clan fashion. 
Perhaps the private sector eventually reaches such dominance that state-ownership under Party 
control fades from importance. But to judge from current policy statements, the reverse appears 
to be intended, a revival of state ownership. The institutional environment to support efficient, 
market-based operations remains lacking. Reform of the institutional framework appears severely 
out of step with the complexity of the economy. Ultimately the Party either establishes the 
necessary Party-external institutional framework for a modern economy to operate efficiently and 
grow, or it finds hitherto non-existing Party-internal mechanisms that allow the efficient operation 
of a modern economy, under Party control.  
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Appendix 1. State-owned Enterprise Share in Gross Domestic Product 
 
The assumed state-owned and state-controlled enterprise (SOSCE) share in Table 2 is based 
on the following considerations. (“SOSCEs” refers to state-owned and state-controlled 
enterprises and is abbreviated as “SOEs” except when “SOEs” explicitly refers to traditional 
SOEs.) 
 
 
Agriculture: Total employment in agriculture is 219.19mio. Employment in SOEs is 2.614mio 
(Finance Ministry data). SOEs are given double weight to account for the likely higher value-
added per employee in SOEs (which are likely concentrated in higher value-added activities). 
 
Mining: Starting point is the share of SOEs in main business revenue of above-norm industrial 
enterprises. (This share is double-checked against the share in employment and the share in 
assets, and appears reasonable.) It is assumed that 85% of value-added in mining is produced 
in above-norm industrial enterprises, and that no SOE is of below-norm size. 
 
Manufacturing: Same as for mining. The share of value-added in this sector produced by above-
norm industrial enterprises is assumed to be 90%. 
 
Utilities: Same as for mining. The share of value-added in this sector produced by above-norm 
industrial enterprises is assumed to be 95%. 
 
Construction: The value-added listed in the construction section of the Statistical Yearbook is 
equal to 0.7735 of the construction value-added listed in the gross domestic product (GDP) 
section and it is assumed that the difference is produced by non-state enterprises. A 
breakdown by ownership in the construction section is available for gross output value (in the 
construction section) with the "state" accounting for a 0.1204 share, collective-owned 
enterprises accounting for 0.0241, foreign enterprises for a miniscule share, and the 
remainder being a 0.8482 residual. It is assumed that the ownership breakdown of gross 
output value equally holds for value-added. It is assumed that the "state" value reflects only 
traditional SOEs and that one-third of the implicit residual reflects state-controlled companies 
(and state joint enterprises). Labor productivity (gross output value per employee) in the 
"state" sector exceeds average labor productivity, and the derived SOSCE share is therefore 
multiplied by the ratio of labor productivity in the state sector to total construction labor 
productivity. 
 
Trade: It is assumed that "above designated size" enterprises (for which some detailed data are 
available) account for 0.7 of value-added in trade (and that all other units that engage in trade 
are not state-owned). For "above designated size" enterprises, wholesale and retail trade 
values are combined, and the share of the state in the "cost of principal business" is used to 
proxy the share of the state in (unknown) value-added of the "above designated size" 
enterprises. Lacking a comprehensive state category, the state is taken to comprise the 
categories traditional SOEs, state joint enterprises, all solely state-owned limited liability 
companies, one-half of all other limited liability companies, and one-half of all stock companies. 
 
Transport: It is assumed that the data coverage in the transport section of the Statistical Yearbook 
covers 90% of transport value-added (with the remainder being by non-state enterprises), and 
that each employee in the different transport sub-sectors listed in the Statistical Yearbook 
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produces the same amount of value-added. With no output or sales data available in the 
transport section of the Statistical Yearbook, the derivation of the state share is based on the 
available employment values. It is assumed that the following shares of employees are 
employees of SOEs: railway 1 (all), road 0.3, water 0.3, air 1, pipeline 1, loading/unloading 
and forwarding agency 0.5, storage 0.5, post 1. 
 
Hotels and catering: Identical assumptions to the case of trade (with the two sub-categories hotels 
and catering in this instance). 
 
Real estate: It is assumed that the real estate section in the Statistical Yearbook covers all real 
estate units. In terms of employment (the only available relevant variable for the purpose here), 
only 0.0209 of employment is in "state" enterprises (with additional small shares reported for 
"collective" and "foreign"); these “state” enterprises are assumed to be traditional SOEs. It is 
further assumed that one-third of the implicit residual share of 0.9069 consists of state-
controlled enterprises. 
 
Scientific research and technical services: It is assumed that the corresponding section in the 
Statistical Yearbook covers all relevant units. For the proxied aggregation of the registration-
based data see the section on trade. 
 
For all other sectors—the SOSCE share, lacking relevant data—has been assumed. Data on 
urban employment (one-quarter of economy-wide employment) by sector with an ownership 
breakdown into state, urban collective, and “other” was considered. 
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Appendix 2. Choice of Performance Indicator 
 
163. In evaluating economic performance, academic economists tend to focus on some measure 
of efficiency change, typically “Total Factor Productivity” (TFP) growth, where TFP growth 
represents that part of output growth that cannot be attributed to capital or labor growth. TFP is 
then often interpreted as “technology,” without, however, providing any rationale for that 
interpretation. (I.e., it is assumed that technology floats in the air and can be stuck into a piece of 
pig iron (capital) to yield a computer, a car, or a T-Bar for house construction, depending on need.) 
High TFP growth, meaning a high growth rate in output that cannot be explained by the growth of 
capital or labor, is then taken to be a positive development of “technology,” and higher TFP levels 
in one enterprise than in another is taken to represent a higher “technology-level” in the first. 
164. For the purpose here, the concept has (at least) two severe shortcomings that argue against 
its use: (i) In the absence of any rationale for what TFP stands for—it could reflect weather, 
political enthusiasm, or any other or all of a million causes, and the one thing it cannot reflect is 
technology, which is embodied in capital and/or labor—interpreting changes in TFP is pointless.69 
(ii) Even if TFP had any meaning (and it won’t be “technology” or “efficiency”), it cannot be 
compared across enterprises or industries, let alone countries, which each have very different 
production relationships.  
165. In contrast, profitability provides a meaningful measure of performance. (i) Profitability is 
crucial for enterprise survival. Losses reduce an enterprise’s net worth, to the point where the 
dwindling amount of equity will lead lenders not to extend further loans to an enterprise, possibly 
leading to illiquidity. Eventually, insolvency and bankruptcy become highly likely. Bankruptcy has 
effects on employment and economic growth. (Already, an unprofitable enterprise will likely see 
stagnation and output reduction.) (ii) “Enterprise A is more profitable than enterprise B” is a 
meaningful statement; profitability is an appropriate measure to compare performance across 
enterprises, industries, and countries. 
166. Relatively high or relatively low profitability opens up possibilities for further exploration and 
implications. For example, why is high profitability not being competed away? Has the state 
erected barriers to entry (or reserved to high-profitability industry for certain enterprises only)? Or 
why do low-profitability enterprises not exit? Does the state provide direct or indirect subsidies 
(for example, via low interest loans)? 
167. Key profitability measures are return on equity (ROE) and return on assets (ROA). ROE is 
the most meaningful measure of performance: It measures the annual return to the capital-
provider, exactly what profitability means. While equity data are frequently available in PRC 
statistics, a breakdown of equity with the sub-category of paid-in equity is less frequently 
available, making it difficult to understand what the variable equity comprises. The alternative 
measure of profitability is ROA, with asset data widely available and having concrete meaning. A 
shortcoming of ROA, however, is that the value of assets relative to equity can vary drastically 
across industries and enterprises. Both, ROA and ROE, are standard measures of economic 
performance across the finance literature. 
 
                                                 
69 To illustrate the point with an example: Assume two identical computers (capital goods) except that they contain 
different processors (processors incorporating different technology levels). If one processor is significantly better 
(higher technology level) than the other, it will likely fetch a higher price. I.e., the technology difference is captured by 
the difference in physical capital values (price of a capital good, in this example the price of the computer). But if 
physical capital values comprise technology levels, then, in a production function estimation, the residual TFP cannot 
capture technology.  
